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1. Face processing: A topic of wide interest 
 
Abstract 
The following chapter reviews the literature in the field of face processing. First, different 
hypotheses of face processing are discussed: the holistic hypothesis, schema hypothesis 
and configural-featural hypothesis. In a further paragraph literature on the face inversion 
effect is reviewed. Then, higher cognitive functions of face processing are addressed, 
focussing specifically on mental imagery and mental rotation of faces. Finally, evidence 
from brain-imaging studies on face perception is discussed. 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Face perception is probably the most highly developed visual skill in human beings. 
From a very early age infants prefer to look at faces than to other objects. Already 30 minutes 
after birth infants track a moving face farther than other moving patterns of comparable 
complexity (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991). Small children will soon learn to 
discriminate between the familiar faces of their parents and faces of strangers. While the 
parents’ faces are associated with safety and cosiness, strangers may evoke a fearful reaction. 
The fact that face perception is so highly developed is not surprising, as faces are a 
biologically relevant stimulus class. Processing information contained in faces is a pivotal 
social skill. Every time we encounter a face we essentially process information that tells us 
whether the face is familiar, what emotion the person conveys and even where his or her 
attention is focussed on. And these processes can be initiated for an almost infinite number of 
faces. Indeed, it is surprising how well human beings can recognize and discriminate 
innumerable different faces. According to a study by Bahrick, Bahrick, and Wittlinger (1975) 
not only face discrimination, but also the long-term memory of faces is very accurate; they 
found that faces can be recognized with a 90% precision after more than 50 years. The 
biological relevance of faces for human beings makes faces a very important object category 
and it can be said, at least for adults, that they are real experts. This expertise helps us to 
overcome a further characteristic of face perception: Faces are typically recognized at the 
exemplar-specific level. In contrast to objects, which we often recognize at the basic level 
(e.g. “chair” or “bottle”), faces are generally recognized at the most extreme subordinate level 
(e.g. “John” or “Paul”). Humans are highly expert at discriminating between individual faces.  
Apart from their biological relevance, empirical data have suggested that face 
recognition is somehow “special”. It has been claimed that faces are processed differently 
than other object classes. But what exactly is so “special” about face perception? Some 
researchers suggested that faces are processed holistically. They understand faces as a class of 
stimuli that are encoded and recognized as whole templates, without representing parts 
explicitly (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Murray, 2004; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002; 
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Robbins & McKone, 2003; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). In contrast, other objects categories such 
as furniture, houses or tools have been thought of as being processed part-based, each part of 
an object being stored separately (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982). The holistic hypothesis 
is discussed in section 1.2. Another aspect that seems unique for faces is the great expertise 
human beings have with faces. A number of authors claimed that expertise with another 
object class (e.g. dog experts) show similar processing characteristics for objects from their 
field of expertise as for faces (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986). This assumption is reviewed in 
section 1.3. Finally, some authors adopt a dual-mode view, claiming that configural and 
featural information is processed following two distinct pathways (e.g., Bartlett, Searcy, & 
Abdi, 2003; Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Schwaninger, Lobmaier, & Collishaw, 2002). The 
featural-configural hypothesis is discussed in section 1.4 (see also chapters 2, 3, and 5). 
Another peculiarity is that faces are a lot more sensitive to inversion than items of other 
object classes. Recognition of upside-down faces drops significantly, and also two 
simultaneously presented inverted faces can only be matched with great difficulty. This face 
inversion effect (FIE) is a robust phenomenon, it has been found when participants name, 
classify, or match photographs or drawings of faces (for an overview see Valentine, 1988). 
The face inversion effect is addressed in section 1.5 (see also Chapter 4 and 5). Closely 
related to the FIE and a possible explanation for the difficulty to recognize upside-down faces 
is the presumption, that recognition of disoriented visual stimuli requires a mental rotation of 
the stimulus. For disoriented faces, the spatial transformation of all features and 
configurations overtaxes the capacity of the underlying mechanism (c.f. Rock, 1973). 
Therefore it is difficult to mentally visualize what an inverted face would look like right side 
up. In section 1.6 another cognitive skill is discussed, namely mental visual imagery of faces. 
There is evidence that perception and imagery at least partly share same mechanisms. Studies 
showing differences and similarities between face perception and face imagery are reviewed 
(see also chapter 3). 
In section 1.7 some characteristics of face processing are explained and illustrated with 
evidence from neuroscience. Studies with neurological patients have shown that lesions in a 
certain area of the temporal lobe lead to selectively impaired face recognition, while the 
ability to recognise objects of similar visual complexity was unaffected. This was interpreted 
as implication that faces are processed in a different brain area than objects. Indeed, neuro-
imaging studies have confirmed that faces evoke selectively more activation in an area in the 
fusiform gyrus consequently termed the fusiform face area (FFA, e.g., Kanwisher, 
McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, Stanley, & Harris, 1999). Neurophysiological 
findings further substantiated this proposition. Single unit recordings in the macaque brain 
identified neurons in the superior temporal sulcus of the macaque brain that responded 
selectively to faces (e.g., Desimone, 1991; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992). Perrett 
and colleagues (1992) found cells that selectively respond to different aspects of faces, such 
as different views of the face and head, or cells that discriminate familiar from unfamiliar 
faces. However, given the amount of different object classes it seems unlikely that there is a 
dedicated brain region for every object class. This observation can be replied to with the 
assumption of distributed neural networks as proposed for example by Ishai, Ungerleider, 
Martin, Schouten, & Haxby (1999). In section 1.8 conclusions are drawn from the previous 
sections and merged together. 
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1.2. Holistic hypothesis of face perception 
The holistic hypothesis of face perception claims that faces are represented and 
recognized as undifferentiated wholes (cf. Tanaka & Farah, 2003). In the early 20th century 
this type of visual apprehension was characterized as “gestalt”, where the perception of the 
whole takes precedence over the sum of its constituent parts. Various interpretations of 
holistic face processing have been suggested. The pure holistic view claims that faces are 
represented as whole templates and that facial parts (or features, components) are not 
explicitly represented (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; see also Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995). 
According to such a view, faces are stored as unparsed perceptual wholes without explicitly 
storing information of the individual parts. A simple analogy of such a holistic face 
representation would be a bitmap, in which only colour values of points are specified without 
providing information about which point belongs to the eyes or nose. The bitmap indeed 
contains eyes and nose, but it does not represent them explicitly. A more moderate view of the 
term “holistic” is held by Maurer and colleagues (Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002), 
who claim that holistic processing is one type of configural processing in which the features 
are glued together into a gestalt. According to Maurer and colleagues, configural processing 
refers “to any phenomenon that involves perceiving relations among the features of a stimulus 
such as a face” (Maurer et al., 2002, p. 255). This definition is very similar to what has been 
defined as configural information (see below). 
A line of studies have been interpreted in favour of the holistic hypothesis. For example, 
Tanaka and Farah (1993) trained participants in recognizing upright faces. In the experimental 
phase, two faces which differed either in the shape of the eyes, nose or mouth were 
simultaneously presented. In a second experimental condition the eyes, nose or mouth were 
presented in isolation, that is without the facial context. Participants had to judge which of 
these faces appeared in the training phase. The authors found that it was more difficult to 
recognize a part of a previously learnt face when it was presented in isolation than when it 
was embedded in the facial context. This difficulty to recognize isolated parts was interpreted 
in favour of a holistic view of face processing. Parts, the authors concluded, are therefore not 
explicitly represented. Similarly, Farah et al. (1998) found that faces are represented more 
holistically in immediate perceptual memory and during perception as compared to inverted 
faces, houses and words. Yet they argue that faces are not “special” because holistic 
representation is confined to faces, but because face recognition is the extreme end of a 
continuum of part-based to more holistic representation. Tanaka and Sengco (1997) hold a 
slightly different view of holistic face processing. Similar to Maurer et al. (2002) they claim 
that featural information and configural information are combined into holistic face 
representations. Whereas Tanaka and Farah (1993) and Farah et al. (1995) claimed that faces 
are represented as unparsed wholes without any representations of parts, Tanaka and Sengco 
(1997) imply that featural and configural information are first represented separately before 
they are integrated into a holistic representation (see also Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993). 
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1.3. Schema hypothesis of face processing 
Another hypothesis has been suggested by Goldstein and Chance (1980). A schema is 
understood as an organizing mechanism for both information input and output. According to 
the schema theory, this mechanism develops and improves according to experiences gained 
through interaction with incoming stimuli. Such an improvement is achieved at the expense of 
flexibility; with growing number of processed “normal” faces the ability to handle variational 
faces declines. With this theory Goldstein and Chance (1980) explain the observation, that 
faces from a foreign racial group seem to resemble each other much more than faces of the 
own race. This other race effect emerges through constant exposure to faces of our own racial 
group: By means of interaction between incoming stimuli the face schema is modified and is 
able to efficiently process a wider range of stimuli. But this enhancement goes with reduced 
flexibility towards deviant faces, resulting in hampered ability to process faces of other racial 
groups. The term schema rigidity has been suggested by Goldstein (1975) to describe the 
reduction of flexibility resulting from overlearning face stimuli. 
The schema hypothesis may explain the observation that faces seem to be processed 
holistically (see Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes, Tan, Brake, & Taylor, 1989; Tanaka, 
2001; see also Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). Diamond and Carey (1986) provided direct evidence 
that expertise might be responsible for “face specific” processing. They tested dog experts on 
upright and upside-down dog pictures and found a similar inversion effect as for pictures of 
human faces, but only for dogs of the breed for which the participants were experts. Insofar 
face processing differs from other object processing in the expertise we have with them. As a 
further consequence of expertise a qualitative shift in processing can be observed. For 
instance in a study by Tanaka and Taylor (1991), bird experts were as fast to recognize 
objects at the subordinate level (“robin”) as they were at the basic level (“bird”). Non-experts 
were consistently faster on basic-level discrimination as compared to subordinate-level 
discriminations. Similarly, because humans are face experts, judgments of face identity 
(subordinate level) are as fast as judgments that are more categorical, for instance gender 
(Tanaka & Taylor, 1991; see also Gauthier & Tarr, 1997).  
Mondloch, Le Grand, and Maurer (2002) showed that expertise for face recognition 
takes many years to develop. Especially configural processing (see section 1.4) seems to be 
fully developed only after the age of 10 years. In a same-different task Mondloch, et al. 
(2002) presented adults and children of 6, 8, and 10 years of age pairs of upright and inverted 
faces. Either the faces were the same, or they differed either in the shape of eyes and mouth 
(featural set), in the distance between the eyes and the mouth (spacing set), or in the shape of 
the external contours (contour set). Children generally made more mistakes in the spacing set, 
giving evidence that their configural processing system has not yet fully developed. 
 
 
1.4. Featural-configural hypothesis of face perception 
Recent studies have shown that a pure holistic view of face perception does not hold. 
Representations of featural and configural information are two important sources of 
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information in face recognition (Bartlett et al., 2003; Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Schwaninger et 
al., 2002). Featural information is referred to as the information contained in the components 
(or parts) of a face (i.e., eyes, nose, mouth etc); configural information is understood as the 
spatial relationship between the features (e.g., Bruce, 1988). The spatial interrelationship of 
facial features was further differentiated by Diamond and Carey (1986) who distinguished 
first-order and second-order relational information. First-order relational information refers to 
the basic arrangement of the parts (e.g., the nose lies between the eyes), whereas second-order 
relational information means the exact metric distances between the features.  
Already Sergent (1984) suggested that faces have featural and configural properties and 
proposed that these two properties are processed following two distinct processing strategies. 
It is suggested that these processing strategies are not mutually exclusive and can unfold 
simultaneously. Sergent (1984) used a two-choice “same-different” judgement task and a 
dissimilarity judgement task on the same set of stimuli to examine the nature of configural 
and featural processing. In each task a face pair was presented in which the two faces were 
either the same, or differed in 1 to 3 different features (eye region, internal spacing, or inferior 
contour. Sergent found that the reaction times decreased linearly as the number of differences 
between the faces increased. This result suggests that the facial features combine additively 
and are processed independently of one another. However, not all her feature manipulations 
were equally salient: faces differing in contour were compared faster than faces differing in 
eyes or internal spacing. Similarly, faces differing in contour were judged as less similar than 
faces that differed in other dimensions. It has to be noted here that the feature manipulations 
used by Sergent (1984) do not involve featural information as defined above. Her 
manipulations included clear configural information, such as for example internal spacing. 
Insofar Sergent’s paradigm did not enable separate investigation of featural and configural 
information. 
Most studies on configural and featural face perception suggest that configural 
processing plays a dominant role over featural processing (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2003; Cabeza & 
Kato, 2000; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Haig, 1984; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Schwaninger et al., 
2002). Yet, this sensitivity to configural information is not face-specific. Gauthier and Tarr 
(1997) found evidence that this sensitivity to configural changes might be explained by a 
more general recognition mechanism fine-tuned by experience with homogeneous stimuli. 
They used “greebles” as stimuli in a series of experiments. Greebles are a computer-generated 
novel class of objects which are comparable to faces, as all exemplars share the same number 
of parts in the same configuration. Gauthier and Tarr (1997) extensively trained participants 
on a set of greebles and found a shift from featural to configural processing. Furthermore, 
Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, and Gore (1999) found that, with growing expertise 
with greebles, fMRI activation in the right fusiform face area (FFA) resembles the pattern 
activity of upright faces (see section 1.7 below). From this standpoint predominance of 
configural processing is not per se face specific, but is modulated by expertise. Similar effects 
have been found for bird and car experts (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000), and 
dog experts (Diamond & Carey, 1986). 
Studies investigating configural and featural face information predominantly used 
stimuli where the configuration was changed (e.g. Haig, 1984; Macho & Leder, 1998; Searcy 
& Bartlett, 1996; Sergent, 1984; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997) or where the features were changed 
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(e.g. Farah et al., 1998; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Sergent, 1984; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Such 
manipulations are problematic, as configural changes may also involve featural changes and 
vice versa (Rakover, 2002; Sergent, 1984). For example stretching the inter-eye distance may 
result in the bridge of the nose appearing wider. Schwaninger, Lobmaier, & Collishaw (2002) 
circumvented this problem by using scrambled and blurred faces. Scrambled faces contain 
only information of the features, whereas, if sufficiently blurred, all featural information is 
lost in blurred faces and isolated configural information remains. To test whether all 
configural information is destroyed in the scrambled faces and vice versa, the faces can be 
both blurred and scrambled at the same time. If the faces are sufficiently blurred, such faces 
will no longer be recognized (Schwaninger et al., 2002). 
A configural representation is qualitatively different than a featural representation, as it 
contains metric distances and spatial relations. Diamond and Carey (1986) suggested that with 
growing expertise items are represented more configurally. As human beings we are experts 
in face recognition, therefore configural information plays a larger role than featural 
information. Additionally, familiarity of a face plays an important role. Buttle and Raymond 
(2003) found that familiar faces are processed more efficiently than recently learned faces. 
They claimed that this is due to a more configural mode of analysis in familiar faces (Buttle & 
Raymond, 2003).  
 
 
1.5. The face inversion effect 
A characteristic which seems to be distinctive for faces is what has been described as 
the face inversion effect (FIE), first reported by Yin (1969). He found a much poorer 
performance for recognizing inverted faces as compared to other inverted objects, such as 
airplanes, houses, or stick figures of men in motion (Yin, 1969). The FIE is a robust 
phenomenon, it has been found when participants name, classify, or match photographs or 
drawings of faces (for an overview see Valentine, 1988). An impressive demonstration of 
how inverted faces are difficult to process was provided by Thompson (1980). He took a 
photograph of the former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and inverted eyes and 
mouth with respect to the whole face. Such a face looks extremely grotesque when viewed 
right-side up, but loses this grotesqueness when the face is inverted (Thompson, 1980). This 
effect is now commonly referred to as Thatcher illusion. Numerous studies have been 
concerned with this phenomenon since then (e.g., Lewis, 2001; Rakover, 1999; Sturzel & 
Spillmann, 2000; Valentine & Bruce, 1985). Sturzel and Spillmann (2000) gradually turned 
different thatcherized faces from 0° through 180° and asked participants to report when the 
face switched from pleasant to grotesque, or vice versa. They found a relatively narrow 
changeover-zone between 97.2° and 118.3° where the change of expression occurred. Sturzel 
and Spillmann suggested that the striking change may be based on the step-tuning properties 
of hypothetical face neurons, rather than a gradual tuning curve. According to Sturzel and 
Spillmann face neurons respond best to faces in a tuning width of ±100° relative to the 
vertical. They claim that these face neurons may also respond to inverted faces, but 
inappropriately. In contrast, Lewis (2001) reported a gradual loss of configural information 
the further a face is turned away from upright. He recorded the reaction times of 40 
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participants while they discriminated thatcherized from normal faces which were presented in 
10 different orientations. Based on these two studies, however, the nature of the dependence 
on the rotation-angle still remains equivocal.  
Why is it so difficult to process an inverted face? An explanation for the face inversion 
effect on the basis of the holistic and schema hypotheses is that faces are mono-oriented and 
clearly have an upright orientation. We rarely see faces upside-down and we may therefore 
only have an upright representation of faces. Furthermore, Farah et al. (1995) claim that 
perception of holistically represented complex patterns is orientation sensitive, and thus 
inversion makes encoding conditions difficult. Further evidence that holistic processing is 
hampered in inverted faces has been found when the top half of a face was aligned with the 
bottom half of another face. When presented upright, adults found it very difficult to identify 
the top half of such a composite face, as they seemed to perceive the face as a whole gestalt. 
When the face was turned upside-down, or when the two halves were misaligned, 
performance improved, because the face did no longer appear as a whole (Hole, 1994; 
Stevenage, 1995; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). 
An alternative answer is the mental rotation hypothesis suggested by Rock (1973), 
based on the featural-configural hypothesis: When we encounter inverted faces, we mentally 
rotate the input picture. In inverted faces “there is a whole set of component figures and 
figural relationships have to be corrected, and it is not possible to succeed in visualizing 
simultaneously how each of these would look were it to be egocentrically upright” (Rock, 
1973, p. 60f). With the mental rotation hypothesis, Irving Rock provided a possible 
explanation for the Thatcher illusion seven years before Thompson first reported this effect. A 
slightly different explanation for the Thatcher illusion is provided by Rakover (1999). He 
interprets the strangeness of upright thatcherized faces as a result of our inability to grasp the 
eyes as locally inverted in the pattern of the upright whole face. When inverted, the 
thatcherized face is perceived as an inverted face and the eyes are perceived in this frame as 
they are: upright eyes. But in this inverted case, the whole face is perceptually not as 
dominant as the individual features (because inversion disrupts perception of the whole face).  
Meanwhile, a widely accepted explanation for the FIE is that inversion substantially 
impairs processing of spatial-relational information. According to Leder and Bruce (1998) it 
is the disruption of configural information instead of holistic information in inverted faces 
which accounts for the face inversion effect (see also Boutsen & Humphreys, 2003; Leder, 
Candrian, Huber, & Bruce, 2001; Maurer et al., 2002; Rock, 1973; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; 
Sergent, 1984; Yin, 1969; for a review see Schwaninger, Carbon, & Leder, 2003). In their 
recent review, Rossion and Gauthier (2002) suggested that “most if not all of the decrease in 
face discrimination performance caused by inversion can be accounted for by the disruption 
in inverted faces of the processing of the local spatial relationships between features” 
(Rossion & Gauthier, 2002, p. 55; see also Leder & Bruce, 2000). As reported above, it is 
claimed that perception of faces relies predominantly on configural information; therefore the 
inversion effect is so pronounced with faces. This leads to a slightly revised formulation of 
Rakover’s (1999) explanation of the Thatcher illusion. In my opinion, the inverted 
thatcherized face does not seem as strange, because such a face can no longer be processed 
configurally. Instead, we have to rely on featural information, which is not as sensitive to 
inversion. We clearly perceive such a face as inverted, but miss that the eyes and mouth are in 
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fact upright. As a consequence we fail to notice the grotesqueness of such a face. In the 
upright thatcherized face however, featural and configural processes act jointly and the 
grotesqueness of the face is apparent. 
Studies aiming to investigate configural and featural processes have often made use of 
the disproportionate sensibility of featural and configural information to inversion. Whenever 
an inversion effect was found authors concluded that configural processing was involved. For 
example, Rhodes and colleagues (Rhodes et al., 1989) showed that “own race” faces exhibit a 
larger FIE than faces of the “other race”. They assumed that “own race” faces constitute high 
expertise, whereas “other race” faces signify low expertise. From their findings they conclude 
that expertise is associated with greater use of configural information in faces. Diamond and 
Carey (1986) found that dog-show judges and dog breeders showed a comparable inversion 
effect for dogs as for faces, but only for dogs of the breed of which they were experts. This 
finding led the authors to the conclusion that with growing expertise a more configural 
processing mode is adopted. Some findings that familiar faces are processed more 
configurally than unfamiliar faces are also based on the FIE. For example, Buttle and 
Raymond (2003) successively showed their participants two pairs of faces. In the second pair 
one of the faces was changed. The task was to detect the changed face; no explicit recognition 
or naming was involved. Performance was significantly better if the changed face was 
famous. However, this advantage for familiar faces was abolished, when the faces were 
inverted. The authors concluded from this result that familiar face processing predominantly 
activates a configural mode of analysis. The conclusions of Mondloch et al. (2002) that 
configural processing takes longer to develop was partly drawn from results involving the 
inversion effect. For adults and 10-year-olds the FIE was larger in pairs differing in the 
distances between the features than in pairs differing in the shape of the features or outer 
contours. However, the size of the inversion effect did not differ between the conditions in the 
younger children. The authors presume that the six and eight-year-olds were less able to take 
advantage of configural information in upright faces (Mondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002). 
Similar results have been found by Freire and Lee (2001). 
It is important to note, however, that although configural information seems highly 
sensitive to inversion, an inversion effect does not necessarily mean configural processing. 
For example, Schwaninger, Lobmaier, and Fischer (2005) found an inversion effect for gaze 
perception. But this effect was found for whole faces and also when only the eyes were 
presented in isolation. This finding led the authors to suggest that the gaze inversion effect is 
probably the result of perceptual learning (Schwaninger, Lobmaier, & Fischer, 2005). 
 
 
1.6. Mental imagery of faces 
Visual images are vision related experiences that are triggered when we recall 
information from long term memory. Visual imagery is referred to the processes involved in 
generating and examining such images. Visual imagery is a basic form of cognition and plays 
a central role in many human activities and according to Kosslyn (1994) imagery is likely to 
be one of the first higher cognitive functions firmly rooted in the human brain. Even in pre-
scientific ages imagery has been the concern of many philosophers, back as far as Aristotle.  
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Almost everybody knows what the Eiffel Tower looks like and to some degree will 
report some kind of visual experience when thinking of it. This affinity of visual perception 
and visual imagery has lead to a great dispute of whether and to which extent imagery and 
perception are alike (for an overview, see Kosslyn, 1994). In his model, Kosslyn (1994) 
suggests three basic components, (1) the visual buffer, (2) long-term stored representations 
and (3) image-processing operations. The visual buffer is a spatially organized array within 
the visual system and constitutes the medium for visual images. Visual images are generated 
by retrieving information from long-term memory and can be inspected and transformed 
within the visual buffer. Visual imagery is initiated by active processes which generate 
images in the visual buffer from the stored descriptions in long-term memory. These 
processing operations are also responsible for inspection and transformation of visual images. 
According to Kosslyn (1994) the difference between perception and imagery lies in the 
generating source of visual images in the visual buffer. While in perception the visual buffer 
is activated “bottom-up” by visual input, it is triggered “top-down” in imagery. 
Visual mental imagery and visual perception have been reported to have common properties 
and even share neural substrates (e.g. Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Ishai, Haxby, & 
Ungerleider, 2002; Kosslyn, 1994; O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). Both can be used for 
priming, albeit priming from visual imagery is weaker (Michelon & Zacks, 2003). Parallel to 
the “what” and “where” system in perception (c.f. Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982), a 
dissociation of visual-object and visual-spatial imagery could be demonstrated in studies of 
patients with brain damage (Levine, Warach, & Farah, 1985). 
Because face perception seems to be a special form of visual perception, face imagery 
suggests itself to be a somewhat special kind of visual imagery. However, face imagery can 
hardly be separated from person-specific information that is not purely visual (character, 
sympathy, voice etc.). Here, only visual aspects of face imagery are addressed. 
 
 
1.7. Evidence from neuro-imaging studies and 
neurophysiology  
Numerous brain imaging studies on face perception have already been conducted. Many 
authors were in search of a region that is specialized on face processing. Indeed, a large 
majority of them found activation in the right fusiform gyrus while processing faces 
compared to objects (e.g., Ishai et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kanwisher et al., 1999; 
Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004). Such findings suggest that the right fusiform gyrus is 
specialized at least for some aspects of face perception and this region of the brain has 
therefore been termed fusiform face area (FFA). In support for such a specialized system for 
face processing, Perrett and colleagues (Perrett et al., 1991) found cells in the STS selectively 
responsive to faces. More so, while some cell populations responded maximally to upright 
front-view faces, other cell populations responded more to profile view faces. 
Other authors suggested that the FFA is not a region specialized for faces, but a region 
that reflects expertise with a certain object class. Evidence for this idea was found in studies 
with greebles, where with growing expertise with greebles fMRI activation in the right 
fusiform face area (FFA) resembled the pattern activity of upright faces (Gauthier et al., 
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1999). Similar effects have been found for bird and car experts (Gauthier et al., 2000). 
However, Rhodes et al. (2004) used faces, Lepidoptera, and common objects and tested 
novice participants in a free viewing and an individuation task. In a second experiment they 
tested Lepidoptera experts. In both groups the FFA responded grater to faces than to 
Lepidoptera or common objects, supporting the face-specifity hypothesis of the FFA. 
Finally, a number of authors postulate a distributed neural system for face processing 
(Haxby et al., 2001; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Ishai, 
Ungerleider, Martin, & Haxby, 2000; Ishai et al., 1999). These authors argue that although it 
may be possible that there are dedicated neural modules for certain biologically relevant 
objects such as faces, which have emerged through evolution, it seems very unlikely that there 
are modules for all object categories. Instead they suggest that the representations of objects 
in the ventral temporal cortex are more widely distributed. Indeed, all objects activate a broad 
expanse of ventral temporal cortex, albeit to varying degrees, suggesting that the 
representation of objects in this cortex may be feature rather than object based. Ishai et al. 
(1999) found three adjacent regions that responded differentially to houses, faces and chairs. 
Indeed, these findings could be interpreted as evidence for separate modules. However, all 
three regions also responded significantly to other object classes. The authors conclude that 
the representations of objects are distributed across ventral temporal cortex and are not 
restricted to category specific anatomically segregated modules. 
Can behavioural findings of two separate routes to face processing be replicated and 
substantiated using neuro-imaging? Only a few studies investigating the issue of two separate 
mechanisms for featural and configural processing have been accomplished so far. For 
example, Rossion et al. (2000) found more activation in the left FFA if subjects focused their 
attention on particular features of faces. If, on the other hand, participants relied more on 
configural mechanisms to process faces the responses were larger in the right FFA. Part-based 
processing therefore reduced face-specific activity in the right fusiform gyrus. Haxby and 
colleagues (Haxby et al., 2000) suggested that a region of the inferior occipital gyrus may be 
involved in the perception of facial parts. Perrett, Rolls, and Caan (1982) recorded single cells 
in the STS and found neurons that were selectively responsive to parts (i.e. eyes, mouth or 
hair). Different cells responded to different features, or subsets of features. The superior 
temporal lobe further seems to be involved in processing changeable aspects of faces (Haxby, 
et al. 2000) and spatial relations (Leube et al., 2003). Leube et al. (2003) found more 
activation in the right superior temporal sulcus and right insula for upright faces than for 
inverted faces and concluded that these regions process configural properties. The authors 
argued that in inverted faces configural processing is hampered, hence the reduced activation. 
Sagiv and Bentin (2001) compared the N170 event-related potential (ERP) component 
triggered by faces of different authenticity (photographs, painted portraits, sketches of faces, 
and schematic faces) and found that N170 did not distinguish between different face types 
when presented upright. However, the N170 was enhanced for inverted natural faces and 
reduced for inverted schematic faces. The authors concluded from this finding that early face 
processing is subserved by a multiple-component neural system processing both configural 
and featural information. They claim that the relative involvement of the two processes is 
determined by whether the presented face activates a holistic perception process or an analysis 
of the features (Sagiv & Bentin, 2001). 
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As reported above, Rossion et al. (2000) suggest a left-lateralization for part-processing. 
However, this evidence comes from studies where participants had to focus their attention on 
certain features of the face. This does not necessarily mean that representations of features can 
be located in the left hemisphere. Also larger responses in the right fusiform face area when 
participants rely more on configural information does not necessarily mean that configural 
representations can be located in the right fusiform gyrus. A lateralization of brain activation 
may simply reflect different strategies in the same face recognition process. Indeed, no 
dissociated systems are expected on the basis of a distributed neural network (Haxby et al., 
2001; Haxby et al., 2000; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin et al., 2000; Ishai et al., 1999). Instead, 
the difference between configural and featural processing is expected to be the result of 
quantitative activation differences within the network. 
There is a scarce number of brain imaging studies investigating whether face perception 
shares similar underlying neural networks as face imagery. These studies suggest that visual 
imagery evokes – at least partly - similar activation as when the faces are in fact perceived 
(Farah, Peronnet, Gonon, & Giard, 1988; Ishai et al., 2002; Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 
2000). In an fMRI study, Ishai and colleagues (Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000) found 
content-related activation in extra-striate cortex and ventral temporal cortex when the 
participants visually imagined faces, houses, and chairs. Further evidence that imagery and 
perception of faces underlie similar neural mechanisms comes from case studies with 
prosopagnosic patients, which revealed that an impairment of face recognition is often 
accompanied with the disability to mentally visualize faces (Charcot & Bernard, 1883; 
Young, Humphreys, Riddoch, Hellawell, & de Haan, 1994; Young & Van De Wal, 1996). 
Some reports, however, have described prosopagnosic patients with intact face imagery (e.g., 
Bodamer, 1947; Pallis, 1955).  
Some studies even found a dissociation between imagery of configural and featural 
information. For example, Ishai et al. (2002) found more activation in the right intraparietal 
sulcus (IPS) and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) when participants attended to features of the 
imagined faces as compared to a more holistic image of the faces. They interpret this increase 
of activation as a result of attention, not as activated featural representations. 
 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
It is evident from the large number of studies that face processing is a topic of wide 
interest. A question conveying most research on face processing is whether faces are 
“special”. Indeed, some findings suggest that faces are processed differently than other object 
classes. In the 1990’s scientists were debating whether faces were processed holistically. 
Behavioural findings were interpreted such that faces are processed as perceptual wholes 
without representing the individual parts. What is special about faces according to these 
authors is that whereas object recognition depends on the decomposition of the object into its 
constituent parts, faces are represented and recognized as undifferentiated wholes (e.g. 
Tanaka & Farah, 2003). Alternatively, some authors suggested that every visual object is 
processed both configurally and part-based, the speciality of face processing being that in 
faces configural information plays a relatively more important role than featural information. 
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Still other authors alleged that the speciality of faces merely lies in the experience we have 
with recognizing and processing faces. Indeed, experts in the field of a certain object class 
showed similar recognition characteristics with objects from their field of expertise as with 
faces (e.g. Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). 
All these hypotheses can be accounted for face processing, and indeed, the different 
hypotheses partly overlap. But of all, the featural-configural hypothesis can explain face 
processing most aptly. Findings seemingly suggesting that faces are processed holistically can 
just as well (or even better) be explained by properties of configural processing. For example, 
Tanaka and Farah (1993) found that parts of faces were recognized better when presented in 
the context of whole face can be explained better by the featural-configural hypothesis. Given 
that faces are predominantly processed on the basis of configural information, it is not 
surprising that the individual parts are recognized more accurately when they are presented in 
the configural context. Allowedly, various interpretations of the term holistic processing have 
been suggested and holistic and configural processing has often been used interchangeably. 
But to conclude from such results that parts are not explicitly processed and represented 
seems a bit overhasty. Many arguments that were interpreted in favour of the holistic 
hypothesis seem to be the result of misapprehension of the definitions of holistic, featural and 
configural processing. For instance, Tanaka and Farah (2003) misleadingly interpreted the 
findings of Sergent (1984) as evidence against the “featural position”. Sergent (1984) found 
that RTs to differences of chin contour was faster than differences in internal spacing. 
Moreover, differences in chin contour and internal spacing produced even shorter RTs than 
differences in chin contour alone. According to Tanaka and Farah (2003) the “featural 
position” demands that the time to make different responses when faces vary by two features 
should never be faster than the time to make a different response when faces differed by the 
most salient feature. This objection does not hold, because differences in internal spacing are 
by definition a property of configural information. The fact that Sergent did not find these 
effects in inverted faces further substantiates this misunderstanding. 
Further evidence in favour of the featural-configural hypothesis comes from studies of 
the face inversion effect (FIE). The FIE seems to be a consequence not of orientation 
sensitivity of holistic representations, but of the disproportionate orientation sensitivity of 
featural and configural information (e.g., Leder & Bruce, 1998; 2000; Searcy & Bartlett, 
1996).  Furthermore, studies seemingly supporting a holistic view of face perception can just 
as well be interpreted in favour of the featural configural hypothesis. For example Farah et al. 
(1995) argued that faces are orientation sensitive because face perception is holistic and the 
perception of holistically represented complex patterns is orientation sensitive. This finding 
however can be explained by differential sensitivity to inversion of features and configural 
information. Because, as has been shown in most studies on face perception, faces seem to be 
processed mainly on the basis of configural information, inverted faces are disproportionately 
more difficult to recognize than inverted exemplars of other object classes. Finally, the 
expertise effect can be explained by the relative more important role of configural information 
in exemplars in the field of expertise.  
The featural-configural hypothesis implies that featural and configural information can 
be processed independently. Indeed, there is empirical evidence to assume two separate routes 
to face perception. In various behavioural studies faces could be recognized both by the 
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features and by the configuration (e.g., Collishaw & Hole, 2002; Schwaninger et al., 2002). 
Further, once again findings from inversion studies support the assumption of two separate 
processing mechanisms. Thus, inversion hampers configural processing whereas features can 
still be processed without mentionable constraints. Additional evidence for two separate 
processing mechanisms comes from developmental studies. Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer 
(2002) found that configural face processing develops more slowly than featural face 
processing. In a same-different task they presented adults and children of 6, 8 and 10 year of 
age with upright and inverted face pairs. Either the pairs were the same, or they differed in 
their features or configuration. Children generally made more mistakes in configural pairs 
compared to adults, giving evidence that their configural processing system has not yet fully 
developed. Furthermore, 6- and 8-year-old children showed a comparable inversion effect for 
featural and configural pairs whereas 10-year-olds showed a larger inversion effect for 
configural pairs (see also Freire & Lee, 2001). Finally, supporting the idea of two separate 
pathways, configural and featural processing could be dissociated anatomically (e.g. Rossion 
et al., 2000; Bartlett et al., 2003). 
The emergence of brain-imaging techniques such as fMRI led the dispute to the 
question of how faces are anatomically represented in the brain. Indeed, brain-imaging studies 
revealed an area in the fusiform gyrus, consequently called the fusiform face area (FFA), 
which is supposedly specialized on faces. Such a specialized face area finds support in studies 
with patients suffering from prosopagnosia. These people have severe difficulties in 
recognizing familiar faces, whereas their performance in recognizing items of other object 
classes remains unimpaired. This deficiency to recognize faces can be ascribed to lesions 
fusiform gyrus, namely in the FFA. Further support for a specialized system is provided by 
studies of single cell recordings in non-human primates. For example, Perrett and colleagues 
found cells in the macaque STS that were selective for faces. Whereas such findings can be 
interpreted in favour of a specialized neural system for face perception, there is evidence that 
questions a special module for face processing. For instance, if we assume a face module a 
coherent implication would presume a specialized system for living objects such as animals or 
trees, or inanimate objects such as chairs, bottles, or different tools. Such a proposition would 
overcharge the capacity of our brains. Further, not only the FFA, but also other brain regions 
are activated by faces. For example, Kanwisher et al. (1997) also found a greater activation 
for faces than objects in the middle temporal gyrus and in the STS.  Further still, expertise 
with a certain object class evokes activation in the FFA, suggesting that the FFA is not 
selective for faces (e.g. Gauthier, etc.). In addition, Joseph and Gathers (2002) found that the 
FFA was also activated by natural and manufactured objects. Such objections can be replied 
to by postulating distributed neural systems for object recognition (e.g., Haxby et al., 2001; 
Haxby et al., 2000; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin et al., 2000; Ishai et al., 1999). 
In the following chapters the assumption is made that features and configuration are two 
important modes of information in face perception. Employing a dual-code view of face 
perception, I assume that configural and featural representations are formed when we 
encounter a face and are activated when we have to recognize a face. It is presumed that these 
representations can be activated bottom-up and top-down, in perception and in imagery. In the 
following chapters the nature of these representations and their interrelationship are studied. I 
use scrambled and blurred faces to separately investigate the role of featural and configural 
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face information. In the scrambled faces eyes, nose and mouth were cut out and were arranged 
so that no feature came to lie in its correct categorical relation to its neighbouring part. Thus, 
the detail information of each facial part was maintained while disrupting the spatial relation 
to the other parts. For configural faces, the stimuli were blurred using a low-pass Gaussian 
filter. By removing higher spatial frequencies from the spectrum present in a picture of a face, 
the overall configuration of the face remains intact, while the details of the features are 
unspecified. Chapter 2 ascertains following questions: When are featural and configural 
representations formed? Are they formed as soon as we see a face? Or do we have to see a 
face longer and repeatedly before we form featural and configural representations? Is there an 
advantage for one kind of representation (e.g., do we memorize faces better when storing 
individual features or when storing the configuration of the features)? The study reported in 
chapter 3 investigates whether configural and featural information can be differentiated in 
mental imagery. Specifically I ask whether mental imagery primes featural or configural 
information, or both. In chapter 4 a study is reported where the influence of the gravitational 
reference frame on the Thatcher illusion investigated. Chapter 5 addresses the question 
whether the Thatcher illusion is restricted to faces. And finally, in chapter 6 a neuro-imaging 
study is reported scrutinizing whether featural and configural processes can be dissociated 
using fMRI. The concluding chapter 7 discusses the results of chapters 2 – 6 and reconciles 
them with previous findings reported in chapter 1. 
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2. Perception of Novel Faces: The Parts Have It! 
Abstract 
It has been suggested that, as a result of expertise, configural information plays a 
predominant role in face processing. This idea was investigated using novel and learned 
faces. In Experiment 1 sixteen participants matched two subsequently presented blurred 
or scrambled faces which could be either upright or inverted in a sequential same-
different matching task. By means of blurring, featural information is hampered, 
scrambling disrupts configural information. Each face was unfamiliar to the participant 
and was presented for 1000 ms. An ANOVA on the d’ values revealed a significant 
advantage for scrambled faces. In Experiment 2 fourteen participants were tested using 
the same design, except that the second face was always intact. Again, the ANOVA on 
the d’ values revealed a significant advantage for scrambled faces. In Experiment 3 half 
of the faces were extensively learned in a familiarization block. The ANOVA of these d’ 
values revealed a significant interaction of familiarity and condition, showing that blurred 
stimuli were better recognized when they were familiar. These results suggest that 
successful processing of configural information requires familiarity with the face whereas 
recognition of novel faces relies predominantly on the processing of featural information. 
In the course of familiarization the importance of configural information increases. 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Faces have attracted the attention of numerous scientists. They are a relevant class of 
stimuli and can be recognized with high accuracy. Long-term memory for faces seems to be 
very reliable; a face can be recognized with 90% accuracy after more than 50 years (Bahrick 
et al., 1975). However, relatively little is known about how we perceive novel faces. Imagine 
seeing a smiling face passing in a crowd. We only see the face for a very short moment, but 
often it can be remembered hours later. This memory may be based on representations other 
than those involved in the recognition of a familiar face. 
Indeed, various studies provide evidence that familiar faces are processed differently 
than unfamiliar faces. For example, in a study by Burton, Wilson, Cowan, and Bruce (1999) 
personally familiar faces could be matched with high accuracy, even if the quality of the 
images was impoverished, whereas unfamiliar faces were matched poorly (see also 
Henderson, Bruce, & Burton, 2001). Burton et al (1999) showed their participants video clips 
of faculty members entering the psychology building, routinely collected by a security 
camera. The video clips were of rather poor quality, as is characteristic for security video 
systems. In the following test phase the participants were shown high-quality photographs of 
faces, half of which had been presented in the video clips. The task was to decide whether 
each of these photographs appeared in the videos. The participants performed significantly 
better if they were familiar with the target faces. The authors concluded that unfamiliar face 
recognition is mainly based on image specific details such as lighting condition and viewing 
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angle. In contrast, recognition of familiar faces seems to be mediated by more generic 
representations which can be generalized over changes of image specific properties (Burton et 
al 1999).  Buttle and Raymond (2003) showed that highly familiar faces are perceptually 
processed more efficiently than recently learned faces. Two pairs of faces were successively 
presented; one of the faces was changed in the second pair. The task was to detect the 
changed face; it did not involve explicit recognition or naming. Performance was significantly 
better if the changed face was famous. This finding is referred to as the superfamiliarity 
effect. 
Several neuro-imaging studies also suggest different processing mechanisms of familiar 
and unfamiliar faces. In an fMRI study Rossion et al (2003) found activation differences in 
areas that are predominantly involved in early perceptual aspects of face processing and 
suggested that several basic functions of the face processing system, such as face detection, 
individual discrimination, and pre-semantic recognition, play a role in differentiating familiar 
faces from novel faces (Rossion, Schiltz, & Crommelinck, 2003; Rossion, Schiltz, Robaye, 
Pirenne, & Crommelinck, 2001). Other brain regions differentiating between familiar and 
unfamiliar faces include the pre-frontal lateral temporal, hippocampal, and parahippocampal 
regions bilaterally (Leveroni et al., 2000). 
Findings from neuro-imaging and behavioural studies suggest a difference between 
processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces. But what is the nature of the mechanism that 
underlies the distinction between novel and familiar faces? It has been suggested that an 
important cause goes back to two types of information processing for featural and configural 
information (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986). Featural information is referred to as the 
information contained in the components of a face (i.e., eyes, nose, mouth etc); configural 
information is understood as the spatial relationship between the features. Diamond and Carey 
(1986) further differentiated configural information, distinguishing between first order and 
second order relational information. They described first order relational information as the 
basic arrangement of the parts, such as “the nose is above the mouth” and “the eyes are above 
the nose”, whereas second order relational information is defined by the metric distances 
between the parts. As all faces share first order relational information, high importance is 
ascribed to second order relational information. Some authors indeed claim that faces are 
processed exclusively on the basis of configural information (e.g., Tanaka & Farah, 1993; 
Farah et al., 1995) whereas others adopt a dual-code view, ascribing importance to both 
featural and configural information (Bartlett et al., 2003; Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Schwaninger 
et al., 2002).   
Many authors made use of the so called face inversion effect (FIE) to impede configural 
processing. It has been shown that processing of second order relational information is 
hampered when the stimuli are presented upside-down (e.g., Leder et al., 2001; Maurer et al., 
2002; Rock, 1973; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Farah et al., 1995; Yin, 1969). In his classic 
study, Yin (1969) found a much poorer performance for recognizing inverted faces as 
compared to other inverted objects, such as airplanes, houses, or stick figures of men in 
motion. Consequently, this phenomenon was termed the face inversion effect (FIE). The FIE 
is a robust phenomenon, it has been found when participants name, classify, or match 
photographs or drawings of faces (for an overview see Valentine, 1988). It was claimed that 
perception of faces relies predominantly on configural information; therefore the inversion 
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effect is so pronounced with faces. In an fMRI study Leube et al. (2003) presented upright 
and inverted faces and the participants had to decide in which orientation the faces appeared. 
Brain activation was calculated for upright minus inverted faces and a signal change in the 
right superior temporal sulcus and right insula was found. The authors suggest that the right 
superior temporal sulcus and regions of the insular cortex may be associated with configural 
processing as no activation was found in these regions when faces were inverted.  
The fact that featural and configural information are unequally sensitive to inversion 
can be interpreted in favour of two dissociable mechanisms processing featural and configural 
information. Indeed, recent findings support the dual-code view that featural and configural 
processing constitute two different routes to face recognition, but that configural coding is the 
hallmark of face processing (e.g., Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Schwaninger et al., 2002; Sergent, 
1984; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; see also Bartlett et al., 2003). Neuro-imaging studies revealed 
further evidence for the existence of two separate mechanisms. Rossion et al. (2000) found a 
hemispheric difference between a configural and featural processing strategy. When 
participants focused their attention on particular features of faces, they showed more 
activation in the left fusiform face area. When they relied more on configural mechanisms to 
process faces activation was larger in the right fusiform face area. 
Various studies have suggested that configural information plays an increasing role with 
growing expertise with an object class (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 2000; 
Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1999; for a review see Rossion & Gauthier, 2002). 
Everyday we have to distinguish between faces of people we know and strangers. Thus, adults 
have had many years to develop expertise in face recognition (Mondloch, Geldart, Maurer, & 
Le Grand, 2003; Mondloch et al. (2002). But expertise has to be distinguished from 
familiarity. Our experience with faces has made us to experts in this object class, but we are 
only familiar with faces we know and have encountered many times. For personally familiar 
faces we have had sufficient time to carefully process the face and acquire representations 
which can be used to identify an observed face. For novel faces, however, there are neither 
featural nor configural representations from past encounters to rely on. In most previous 
studies investigating featural and configural information the faces were first presented in a 
learning phase, so that participants could build up representations of the faces. Sometimes 
faces of celebrities were used, of which the participants already had representations (e.g., 
Buttle & Raymond, 2003; Collishaw & Hole, 2002). If unfamiliar faces were used, the 
exposure time was at least 3 seconds (e.g., Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Collishaw & Hole, 2002; 
Leder & Bruce, 1998) or even longer (Haig, 1984; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Schwaninger et al., 
2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). In the present study the possibility that the participants could 
acquire representations of the stimuli faces was minimized by only briefly presenting novel 
faces without any encoding phase prior to the study. The present study therefore differs from 
the studies mentioned above in that the stimuli were in fact novel; the exposure was limited to 
1 second only. 
The issue addressed in the present study was how faces are processed when seen for a 
brief duration only. I used scrambled and blurred stimuli to separately investigate the role of 
featural and configural information in novel faces. When a face is sufficiently blurred, the 
componential information of the features is reduced (e.g., the individual shape and texture of 
the eyes, mouth, nose).  Likewise, configural information of a face is reduced, when its 
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constituent parts are scrambled (Collishaw & Hole, 2000, 2002; Schwaninger et al., 2002; for 
a review see Rakover, 2002). Schwaninger et al. (2002) determined their blur level by 
simultaneously blurring and scrambling the faces and thus impairing configural and featural 
information. If scrambling and blurring faces are adequate manipulations to separately 
examine configural and featural processing, faces that are simultaneously blurred and 
scrambled should no longer be reliably recognized. This was indeed the case in the control 
experiment reported by Schwaninger et al. (2002). If faces are indeed special in a sense that 
they are predominantly coded configurally, then an advantage for a blurred face, as opposed 
to a scrambled face, is expected when briefly presented. Alternatively, if configural coding 
relies on the familiarity of a face, a briefly presented blurred face will not be reliably 
recognized.  
All experiments reported here employ a same-different sequential matching task with 
blurred, scrambled and intact faces which could be either upright or inverted. In Experiment 1 
two sequentially presented blurred or scrambled faces had to be matched. In Experiment 2 a 
blurred or a scrambled face had to be matched with an intact face. Experiment 3 tests the 
influence of familiarity on configural and featural face processing.  
 
 
2.2. Experiment 1 
Using scrambled and blurred faces as stimuli, the aim of Experiment 1 was to separately 
investigate the role of configural and featural information when processing novel faces. Four 
different conditions were tested. In the congruent conditions a blurred face had to be matched 
with another blurred face or a scrambled face had to be matched with another scrambled face. 
In the incongruent conditions a blurred face had to be matched with a scrambled face and vice 
versa. 
If configural information plays a dominant role for processing novel faces, participants 
are expected to perform better when blurred faces have to be matched. If, on the other hand, 
configural information cannot be processed instantly, an advantage is expected for scrambled 
faces. Inversion is known to disrupt configural information to a much larger degree than 
featural information. Therefore I expected an inversion effect in the blurred condition but not 
in the scrambled condition. 
 
 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen participants (12 female / 4 male) ranging in age from 21 to 36 years volunteered to 
participate in Experiment 1. They were paid for their participation and all reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
2.2.1.2 Apparatus 
The study was run on a 15.1” Pentium 4 portable Computer using Superlab Pro 2.0.2 running 
on Windows NT. The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. The participants were seated 
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on a height-adjustable chair and responded by using a Cedrus© Response Pad (RB-520). They 
were asked to keep the head still on a head-rest, keeping a viewing distance of 500 mm 
constant. Each stimulus face appeared 95 mm wide and 125 mm high and thus subtended a 
visual angle of approximately 9.5° horizontally. 
2.2.1.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli were created from 60 photographs of Caucasian faces (26 male, 34 female) taken 
at the University of Zurich in the years 2000 and 2001. The models agreed on their 
photographs being used for experimental studies. The faces were of a neutral expression and 
were photographed from a frontal view. All faces were scaled to a standard size of 300 pixels 
across the width of the face at pupil level. For the blurred condition, the stimuli were created 
in three steps. First, colour information was discarded in the intact faces. This was done 
because colour does not contain any space related information. Second, the faces were blurred 
using a Gaussian filter with a sigma of 0.025 of image width in frequency space, using the 
equation exp(-f2 / (2*sigma2)). This blur level was slightly stronger than the blur level used 
by Schwaninger et al. (2002). I decided to increase the blur level to avoid ceiling effects. In a 
third step the faces were cut 
out with an elliptic tool 
provided by Adobe Photoshop 
7.0 using soft contours (5 
pixel feather). Thus the outer 
features of the faces such as 
head shape and hair line were 
discarded and all the faces 
appeared at the same size and 
shape (296 pixels wide, 385 
pixels high). An example of a 
blurred stimulus is shown in 
Figure 1a. 
 
a b c
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli. a) blurred face used in Experiment 1 -
3; b) scrambled face used in Experiment 1 - 3; c) intact face used in 
Experiment 2 and 3. 
Scrambled faces were created from intact faces in the following steps. Eyes, mouth and 
nose were cut out with the elliptic tool described above (eyes: 131 pixels wide and 95 pixels 
high, mouth 160 x 82, nose 98 x 145 pixels). These features were placed on a black 
background and scrambled in four different versions, to ensure that the features did not appear 
at the same location in each scrambled stimulus. Thus the location of each feature was not 
predictable. Each scrambled version was arranged so that no part was situated in its natural 
relation to its neighbouring part. The scrambled features were placed within the same area as 
the blurred stimuli, so they subtended to the same visual angle. An example of a scrambled 
stimulus can be seen in Figure 1b. All the stimuli could either appear upright or inverted.  
 
2.2.1.4 Task and Procedure 
Experiment 1 was a sequential matching task. A trial consisted of a fixation cross which 
appeared for 500 ms, followed by a stimulus face which was either scrambled or blurred and 
either upright or inverted. After 1000 ms the stimulus face disappeared and was replaced with 
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a random dot mask, to avoid afterimages of the stimuli. After 1000 ms the mask was replaced 
by the second face stimulus which was again either blurred or scrambled and either upright or 
inverted. After 1000 ms the second stimulus face disappeared and the screen turned blank 
until an answer key was pressed and the next trial began. Participants were told to respond as 
fast and as accurately as possible by pressing the appropriate key on the response pad. Thirty-
two different trials were possible: a trial could be same or different, the first face could be 
blurred or scrambled and upright or inverted, and the second face could be blurred or 
scrambled and upright or inverted (2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2). When both faces were scrambled they 
never appeared in identical versions.  
Prior to the experiment all participants gave informed consent. They received written and oral 
instructions and underwent 12 practice trials to ensure that they understood the task. None of 
the stimuli used in the practice trials occurred in the experiment proper. The experiment 
consisted of two blocks with 128 trials each encompassing all possible conditions. Different 
face pairs were used in each block and the order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants. Each block was approximately 10 minutes long. After the first block participants 
were able to take a break in order to regain their attention. 
 
 
2.2.2 Results 
The d’ values were calculated for each participant in each condition by subtracting the 
z-transformed false alarm rates from the z-transformed hit rates. For false alarm rates of 0 and 
hit rates of 1 I used an approximation of the z-values -3 and 3, respectively. A total of 16 
conditions resulted from combinations of scrambled (sc), blurred (bl), upright (upr) and 
inverted (inv) faces. For example, the condition in which an upright blurred face was followed 
by an inverted scrambled face will be abbreviated bl/upr-sc/inv. The average d’ values are 
shown in Figure 2. One sample t-tests (two-tailed) on each condition revealed that all 
conditions differed 
significantly from 0, except in 
the conditions bl/inv-sc/upr 
(d’ = 0.104, t = 0.651, p = 
.525) and bl/inv-sc/inv (d’ = 
0.207, t = 0.879, p = .393). 
Using a within-subjects 
design, a two-way ANOVA 
was carried out on the factors 
presentation mode (bl-bl, sc-
sc, bl-sc, sc-bl) and 
orientation (upr-upr, inv-upr, 
upr-inv, inv-inv), revealing 
significant main effects of presentation mode, F(3,45) = 45.71, MSE = 3.1, p < .001, and 
orientation, F(3,45) = 5.78, MSE = 1.32, p < .01. The interaction presentation mode x 
orientation was not significant, F(9,135) = 1.37, MSE = 1.04, p = .207. Mean d’ values for 
presentation mode were: bl-bl, M = 2.36, SE = 0.25; sc-sc, M = 3.58, SE = 0.36; bl-sc, M = 
.44, SE = 0.1; and sc-bl, M = 0.67, SE = 0.13. Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons (Bonferroni 
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Figure 2. Mean d’ values for the 4 conditions in Experiment 1, the 
error bars depict standard errors. 
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corrected) revealed a difference between the conditions with congruent presentation modes 
(bl-bl and sc-sc), SE = 0.3, p < .01, showing that two scrambled faces were better matched 
than two blurred faces. Moreover, both congruent conditions revealed significantly higher d’ 
values than the non-congruent conditions, as revealed in post-hoc pair-wise comparisons 
(Bonferroni corrected) for bl-bl with bl-sc, SE = 0.2, p < .001, and for bl-bl with sc-bl, SE = 
0.31, p < .001, for sc-sc with bl-sc, SE = 0.34, p < .001, and for sc-sc with sc-bl, SE = 0.44, p 
< .001. The incongruent conditions bl-sc and sc-bl did not differ, SE = 0.2, p = 1.000. 
The different influence of orientation on scrambled and blurred faces was tested with 2 
one-way ANOVAs computed separately for the two congruent conditions (bl-bl and sc-sc). A 
significant effect of orientation was found for blurred, F(3,45) = 3.5, MSE = 2.05, p < .05, but 
not for scrambled stimuli, F(3,45) = 1.28, MSE = 1.22, p = .293. 
For the analysis of the 
reaction times (RTs) only the 
correct answers were 
included. Also, RTs over 
3000 ms were discarded and 
treated as outliers. The RTs 
were subjected to a three-way 
ANOVA with the factors 
presentation mode (bl-bl, sc-
sc, bl-sc, sc-bl), sameness 
(same, different), and 
orientation (upr-upr, inv-upr, 
upr-inv, inv-inv), which 
revealed a main effect of 
presentation mode, F(3,45) = 
16.31, MSE = 78336.26, p < .001. The factors sameness and orientation did not reach 
significance; neither did any of the interactions. The mean RTs for presentation mode were as 
follows: bl-bl, M = 1339 ms, SE = 61.4, sc-sc, M = 1308 ms, SE = 69.6, bl-sc, M = 1498 ms, 
SE = 66.7, and sc-bl, M = 1493 ms, SE = 62.1. Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons (Bonferroni 
corrected) revealed that congruent matches were faster than incongruent matches, between bl-
bl and bl-sc (SE = 29.668, p < .001) and between bl-bl and sc-bl (SE = 43.422, p < .05). 
Likewise, the comparisons of sc-sc with bl-sc (SE = 22.11, p < .001) and sc-sc with sc-bl (SE 
= 45.09, p < .01) reached statistical significance. The difference between bl-bl and sc-sc was 
not significant (SE = 28.47, p = 1.000). The mean RTs are depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Mean RT values for the 4 conditions in Experiment 1, 
depicted separately for different and same trials. The error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Processing featural information evoked fewer errors, as can be concluded from the 
significantly higher d’ values in the sc-sc condition compared to the bl-bl condition. This 
evidence goes in line with the hypothesis that configural information in novel faces cannot be 
processed as easily as featural information. When a face is presented for a brief duration only, 
the observer has to rely predominantly on featural information for later recognition. 
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The results show that both isolated configural and featural face information contained in 
the input stimulus can be processed reliably; the d’ values of the bl-bl condition and the sc-sc 
condition were recognized above chance level. The fact that the RTs of the bl-bl and sc-sc 
conditions did not differ statistically suggests that there was no speed-accuracy trade off. 
When blurred faces were involved, inversion hampered correct matching of two faces, 
whereas no inversion effect could be found for scrambled faces. This goes in line with several 
other studies, reporting that featural information is not as orientation sensitive as configural 
information (e.g., Leder et al., 2001; Maurer et al., 2002; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Farah et al., 
1995; Yin, 1969). Furthermore, the effect of inversion for blurred faces provides evidence that 
no featural information was available to solve the task. The missing inversion effect for 
scrambled faces on the other hand suggests that configural information in these faces was in 
fact eliminated. Unexpectedly, all but two incongruent conditions were matched above chance 
level. This may suggest that scrambled and blurred faces do not contain mutually exclusive 
elements of the facial image. Alternatively, it could suggest that featural and configural 
processing is not entirely independent. Which of these explanations holds true can not be 
concluded on the basis of the present data. However, the fact that the congruent conditions 
were matched more accurately than the incongruent conditions denotes that featural and 
configural processing was substantially impaired through the manipulations. 
Analysis of the RTs revealed that congruent matching (i.e., when the faces were 
manipulated by the same means) was faster than incongruent matching (scrambled faces with 
blurred faces and vice versa). This goes in line with the decreased d’ values in the incongruent 
conditions. There was no effect of orientation, which suggests that for angles around 180° 
observers can flip the stimulus to the upright, instead of mentally rotating it in the picture 
plane (cf. Kanamori & Yagi, 2002; Murray, 1997). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that featural information in novel faces is 
processed more efficiently than configural information. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that the formation of configural representations takes longer than forming featural 
representations. Therefore the recognition of novel faces relies predominantly on featural 
information. 
 
 
2.3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed that isolated configural or featural information can be processed. 
But, matching two stimuli containing either featural or configural information may rely on 
different strategies than actually using configural or featural information to recognize a new 
face which is intact. Furthermore, we mainly encounter intact faces in everyday situations. So 
the question addressed in Experiment 2 was whether natural novel faces can be recognized on 
the basis of isolated configural or featural information. The same design was used as in 
Experiment 1, except that the second face was always intact. An intact face contains both 
kinds of information, but not in isolated form. In the present task isolated configural and 
featural information have to be transferred to an intact face and any kind of direct matching 
can be ruled out. If novel face processing relies more on featural information, scrambled faces 
are expected to be matched more reliably to intact faces than blurred faces.  Furthermore, no 
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effect of inversion for scrambled faces was expected since featural representations are likely 
processed in an orientation-invariant manner. 
 
 
2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
Fourteen participants (10 female / 4 male) ranging in age from 21 to 36 years volunteered to 
take part in Experiment 2. They were paid for their participation and all reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
2.3.1.2 Apparatus 
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. 
2.3.1.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, except that in addition to the scrambled and 
blurred stimuli un-manipulated, intact faces were used. The intact stimuli were cut out with 
the same elliptic tool as were the blurred stimuli, thus they were the same in size and shape. 
Figure 1c shows an example of an intact stimulus. Again, all faces were presented either 
upright or inverted. 
2.3.1.4 Task and Procedure 
The task and procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that the second stimulus face 
was always an intact face. Sixteen different trials were possible (2 x 2 x 2 x 2). The 
experiment encompassed a total of 256 trials. 
 
 
2.3.2 Results 
 
As in Experiment 1 the d’ 
values were calculated for 
each participant in each 
condition. The mean d’ values 
are depicted in Figure 4. One 
sample t-tests (two-tailed) on 
each condition revealed that 
all conditions differed 
significantly from 0.  
Using a within-subjects 
design, the d’ values were 
subjected to a two-way 
ANOVA with the factors 
presentation mode (bl, sc) and 
orientation (upr-upr, inv-upr, upr-inv, and inv-inv), revealing a significant main effect of 
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Figure 4. Mean d’ values for the 2 conditions in Experiment 2, the 
error bars depict standard errors. 
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presentation mode, F(1,13) = 
73.32, MSE = 1.03, p < .001, 
and orientation, F(3,39) = 
3.51, MSE = 0.69, p < .05. A 
post-hoc pair-wise 
comparison (Bonferroni 
corrected) of the presentation 
mode was significant, SE = 
0.19, p < .001, showing that 
scrambled faces (mean d’ = 
2.6, SE = 0.19) were better 
matched with intact faces than 
blurred faces (mean d’ = 0.96, 
SE = 0.06). The interaction 
presentation mode * 
orientation was not significant, F(3,39) = 2.24, MSE = 0.51, p = .099. 
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Figure 5. Mean RT values for the 2 conditions in Experiment 2, 
depicted separately for different and same trials. The error bars 
represent standard errors.
To separately investigate the effect of orientation on scrambled and blurred faces, two 
one-way ANOVAs were computed for the blurred conditions and the scrambled conditions, 
revealing a significant effect of orientation for blurred, F(3,39) = 8.4, MSE = 0.23, p < .001, 
but not for scrambled stimuli, F(3,39) = 1.68, MSE = 0.98, p = .186. 
As in Experiment 1 only RTs under 3000 ms of the correct answers were taken into 
account. A 2 x 2 x 4 ANOVA on the RTs with the factors presentation mode (bl, sc), 
sameness (same, different), and orientation (upr-upr, inv-upr, upr-inv, inv-inv) revealed a 
main effect of presentation mode, F(1,13) = 11.66, MSE = 35107.21, p < .01, and sameness, 
F(1,13) = 4.83, MSE = 27299.6, p < .05. It took the participants longer to respond when the 
intact face was preceded by a blurred face (M = 1352 ms) compared to when the intact face 
was preceded by a scrambled face (M = 1266 ms).  The RTs were shorter when the two faces 
were the same (M = 1285 ms) than when they were different (M = 1333 ms). There was no 
effect of orientation; neither were there any interactions. The average RTs are depicted in 
Figure 5. 
 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
The d’ values were significantly larger in the scrambled condition than in the blurred 
condition, suggesting an advantage for featural information in the processing of novel faces. 
The advantage for featural information is also reflected in the shorter RTs in the scrambled 
condition. This finding is not in line with several studies providing evidence that face 
processing relies mainly on configural information (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah et al., 
1998; Mondloch et al., 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1991, 1993; Farah et al., 1995). It could be 
argued that in the scrambled condition a picture-matching strategy could be adopted which 
accounts for the higher d’ values in this condition, because the features are contained 
unchanged in the intact faces. However, it has to be noted that the scrambled and intact faces 
are not presented simultaneously. Therefore a pure perceptual matching strategy could not 
have been adopted. Moreover, also the configural information contained in the blurred faces 
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remains unchanged in the intact faces. Therefore, a similar kind of matching strategy could 
have been used just as well in the blurred conditions. In one condition parts had to be matched 
with a whole face, in the other condition the configuration had to be matched with the spatial 
relations within the whole face. 
As expected, and in line with the findings of Experiment 1, inversion disrupted 
recognition in the blurred condition, but had no effect in the scrambled condition. A missing 
inversion effect in the scrambled condition indicates that no configural information could be 
used to recognize the face. Above all, this finding suggests that featural representations are 
orientation-invariant; the individual features could be processed independent of orientation. 
The large inversion effect in the blurred condition, however, suggests that the information 
available in blurred faces was predominantly configural. 
The analysis of the RTs supports the hypothesis that featural information is processed 
more easily in novel faces. Scrambled faces were matched with intact faces significantly 
faster than blurred faces. As in Experiment 1 no effect of inversion was found for the RTs.  
 
 
2.4. Experiment 3 
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that novel faces are processed primarily on featural 
information contained in the facial parts. Experiment 3 was concerned with the question 
whether configural information becomes more important when a face is familiar, as suggested 
for example by Buttle and Raymond (2003). Two sets of faces were used, one set was 
extensively studied before the experiment, the other set consisted of novel faces. If configural 
information becomes more important during the course of familiarization, an increase of d’ 
values would be expected in the blurred condition for learned faces, whereas the d’ values in 
the scrambled condition were expected to be comparable for both learned and novel faces. 
 
 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Participants 
Eighteen participants (9 female / 9 male) ranging in age from 22 to 33 years (mean 28.9) took 
part in Experiment 3. They were paid for participation and all reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
2.4.1.2 Apparatus 
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1 and 2. 
2.4.1.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2. Figure 1 shows examples of the stimuli. In 
Experiment 3 all stimuli were presented in upright orientation only. 
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2.4.1.4 Task and Procedure 
The task was the same as in Experiment 2. Twenty faces were randomly chosen for the 
familiar set and were included in a learning session prior to the experiment proper. In the 
learning session, participants were subsequently presented 20 intact faces. After 10 seconds 
the face disappeared and the next face appeared as soon as the centre button was pressed. The 
learning session was repeated three times with a different presentation order of the faces, 
which was randomized online. After the three learning sessions an old-new recognition test 
was interposed. In this test the 20 learned faces were subsequently presented together with 20 
distractor faces. For each face participants were required to decide whether the face was “old” 
(i.e., whether it was one of the faces from the learning session) or whether it was “new”. In 
the experiment proper 40 pairs (20 same, 20 different) were created from the 20 old faces and 
40 pairs (20 same, 20 different) were created from 20 new faces. These new faces were other 
faces than the distractor faces used in the learning test. Thus, the experiment consisted of 80 
face pairs. 
 
 
2.4.2 Results 
Participants were excluded 
from the analyses if they 
failed to recognize at least 
70% of the studied faces in 
the old-new recognition task. 
By ensuring that more than 
70% of the faces were 
recognized accurately, it 
could be assumed that these 
faces were sufficiently 
learned. Thus, two 
participants were discarded 
from the analyses. Only the 
data of the remaining 16 
participants (9 female, 7 male) were included in the following analyses (mean recognition rate 
90.3%). As in the previous experiments d’ and RTs were analyzed. The mean d’ values are 
depicted in Figure 6. One sample t-tests (two-tailed) on each condition revealed that all 
conditions differed significantly from 0 (all t > 5.6, p < .001). Using a within-subjects design, 
the d’ values were subjected to a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the factors 
presentation mode (bl, sc) and familiarity (old, new), revealing a main effect of presentation 
mode, F(1,15) = 8.008, MSE = 2.93, p < .05. There was no effect of familiarity, but the two-
way interaction of presentation mode and familiarity reached statistical significance, F(1,15) 
= 5.989, MSE = .886, p < .05. This interaction was due to the blurred condition, as two sample 
t-tests (two-sided) between the d’ values of familiar and unfamiliar faces were significant 
only in the blurred condition, t(15) = 2.597, p < .05. In the scrambled condition this 
comparison was not significant. Furthermore, the comparison of the blurred and the 
0
1
2
3
4
5
bl-intact
unfam
sc-intact bl-intact
fam
sc-intact
d-
pr
im
e
d-
pr
im
e
 
Figure 6. Mean d’ values for the 2 conditions in Experiment 3, 
depicted separately for familiar and unfamiliar trials. The error bars 
depict standard errors. 
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scrambled condition for novel faces was significant (T = 4.332, p = .001), for familiar faces 
the same comparison was not significant (T = 1.145, p = .27). 
 
As in the previous 
experiments only RTs under 
3000 ms of the correct 
answers were taken into 
account. A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
on the RTs with the factors 
presentation mode (bl, sc), 
familiarity (familiar, 
unfamiliar), and sameness 
(same, different) revealed a 
main effect of familiarity, 
F(1,15) = 14.48, MSE = 
15901.745, p < .01. It took the 
participants longer to respond 
when the faces were unfamiliar (M = 1225 ms) compared to when the faces were familiar (M 
= 1140 ms).  The main effect of presentation mode did not reach significance; neither did any 
of the interactions. The average RTs are depicted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Mean RT values for the 2 conditions in Experiment 3, 
depicted separately for familiar and unfamiliar trials. The error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
2.4.3 Discussion 
The most important finding of Experiment 3 was that familiarity selectively improved 
recognition of blurred faces. For recognizing scrambled faces learning a face beforehand had 
no effect. This finding strongly supports my hypothesis that for processing novel faces 
featural information plays a dominant role and confirms previous findings of Buttle and 
Raymond (2003) who claimed that configural information is more important in familiar faces 
than in unfamiliar faces. 
When a face becomes familiar, the configuration becomes more and more important. 
For unfamiliar blurred faces d’ values were comparable to the upr-upr condition in 
Experiment 2. For unfamiliar scrambled faces the d’ values in Experiment 3 were somewhat 
higher than in Experiment 2. This could be due to the fact that in Experiment 3 the unfamiliar 
pairs were created from only 20 faces. Blurred and scrambled conditions did not differ when 
the faces were familiar, but differed significantly for novel faces. It becomes clear that 
configuration is an important source of information to recognize both novel and familiar 
faces. However, the relative importance of configural information is reduced   in novel faces. 
The RTs were significantly shorter for familiar faces. This was the case for scrambled and 
blurred conditions. It is likely that existent representations of features and configural 
information speed up the process of face recognition. 
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2.5 General Discussion 
The main finding of this study is that featural information plays a larger role than 
configural information in recognizing novel faces. A significant advantage was found for 
scrambled faces, which contained isolated featural information. Blurred faces, which contain 
isolated configural information, were recognized less accurately when presented briefly. For 
familiar faces (i.e., for faces that were extensively learned before the experiment) configural 
information showed growing importance. The present results suggest that in order to 
effectively process configural information, a face has to be at least somewhat familiar. In 
other studies, faces had to be learned during a certain amount of time (e.g. Cabeza & Kato, 
2000; Leder & Bruce, 1998, 2000; Schwaninger et al., 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Farah et 
al., 1995) or highly familiar famous faces were used (e.g., Buttle & Raymond, 2003; 
Collishaw & Hole, 2000, 2002). In both cases it was ensured that the observers had configural 
representations of the faces before the experiment began. In Experiments 1 and 2 of the 
present study novel faces were presented for one second only. In Experiment 3 I specifically 
tested the influence of familiarity on the processing of configural information. The results 
clearly support the view, that the importance of configural information increases in familiar 
faces, whereas featural information is processed equally well in novel and familiar faces. 
Although configural information could be processed in novel faces (blurred faces were 
matched above chance level), the relative importance of the configuration was reduced 
compared to familiar faces. On the basis of the present study I come to slightly different 
conclusions than a similar study by Collishaw and Hole (2000). They also used scrambled and 
blurred faces to separately analyse featural and configural processing and reported no 
difference between celebrities and unfamiliar faces. Moreover, they found no difference 
between the scrambled and blurred conditions. However, the participants in that study saw the 
unfamiliar faces once before during 3 seconds.  This brief exposure might have sufficed to 
build a configural representation. Collishaw and Hole’s unfamiliar condition is therefore 
comparable to the familiar condition in Experiment 3, where no difference between blurred 
and scrambled faces was found. Another reason why Collishaw and Hole (2000) found 
relatively high d’ values for blurred faces could lie in the fact that they used faces where 
external features such as head shape and hairline were visible. Such features may facilitate 
recognition, as they are very characteristic for an individual face. I discarded such information 
by presenting each face in the same oval shape, thus the participants only could rely on the 
spatial relationship between facial parts. 
The fact that novel and familiar faces are processed differently is consistent with the 
assumption of separate processing mechanisms for featural and configural information. For a 
novel face, no configural representation exists. Instead, we rely on featural information, which 
can be processed easily with only limited experience with the face. When a face becomes 
more familiar the configuration of that face is learned and a configural representation is 
formed. For novel faces the processing of featural information dominates and once configural 
representations have been formed the efficiency of configural processing increases. 
Various authors have suggested that expertise refines configural processing (Diamond 
& Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1999; Rossion & 
Gauthier, 2002). On the basis of the present data I claim that unfamiliar, novel faces primarily 
activate a featural mode of analysis. This is in line with the findings of Buttle and Raymond 
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(2003) who report that it is growing familiarity with a face which is crucial for configural 
processing. 
Blurred faces showed an effect of inversion, whereas scrambled faces did not. This 
finding indicates that configural information was destroyed in the scrambled stimuli and 
preserved in the blurred stimuli, as configural information in faces is responsible for the FIE. 
More important, a missing FIE for scrambled faces suggests that featural representations are 
orientation-invariant; features are not only processed fast, but also regardless of their 
orientation. Furthermore, the fact that inversion affects scrambled and blurred stimuli to a 
different degree provides further support for two dissociable processing mechanisms for 
configural and featural information. Whether these two mechanisms can be dissociated 
anatomically is not yet fully clear. Findings of Rossion et al (2000) show an asymmetric 
hemispheric activation, with a higher activation in the right hemisphere for configural 
processing and in left hemisphere for featural processing. On the basis of a distributed neural 
network (Haxby et al., 2001; Haxby et al., 2000; Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Ishai et 
al., 1999) no dissociable mechanisms are expected. Instead, the difference between configural 
and featural processing is suggested to be the result of quantitative activation differences 
within the same network. It has to be the issue of future studies to further resolve whether 
featural and configural processing follow two anatomically distinct pathways. 
A difference between familiar and unfamiliar faces is that familiar faces have been 
visually explored extensively and therefore well practiced scan paths of eye movements have 
been acquired. These scan paths play an active role in visual recognition (Liversedge & 
Findlay, 2000); yet this information is available only when sequences of eye movements have 
been memorized before. In this study novel faces were presented so briefly that participants 
had no scan path to be recalled from long-term memory. It is possible that eye scan paths 
reflect the expertise specific to the processing of configural information. Indeed, neuro-
imaging has revealed that the neuronal resources used for eye movements changes with the 
familiarity of the scan path to be executed (Grosbras et al., 2001). 
The underlying mechanisms for processing novel faces are also interesting for forensic 
concerns, such as eye-witnessing. Situations are imaginable where a face is only seen for an 
instant, but can still be remembered clearly. For example, some witnesses of hit-and-run 
accidents report that they explicitly remember the face of the absconding driver, although it 
was only seen for a trickle of a moment. The present data suggest that such memories are 
based on featural representations. This finding may also have important implications for the 
use of security surveillance systems. Video images captured by security cameras are generally 
of low resolution. Only familiar people captured by the camera are recognized with high 
accuracy, unfamiliar people are identified very poorly (Bruce, Henderson, Newman, & 
Burton, 2001; Burton et al., 1999). The usage of high resolution cameras would enable the 
security surveillance to process more featural details, as offenders are unlikely familiar to the 
security guards. 
Nevertheless, this proposition is not completely consistent with findings of studies 
investigating memory of faces. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) reported that 
participants demonstrated an impaired ability to recognize a person if they described the 
person verbally prior to the recognition task. This phenomenon has been termed the verbal-
overshadowing effect. Macrae and Lewis (2002) interpreted the verbal-overshadowing effect 
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on the basis of featural and configural processing strategies. They suggest that memory of a 
face is disrupted when a featural processing strategy is triggered. In contrast, adopting a 
configural processing strategy enhances the accuracy of face recognition. At first sight my 
results do not seem in line with studies on the verbal-overshadowing effect. It has to be noted, 
however, that in studies on the verbal-overshadowing effect participants saw 30 seconds of a 
videotaped simulated bank robbery, which was probably long enough to form a configural 
representation of the robber. In this study the encoding time was 1 second and it seems that 
this was too short to efficiently process configural information. Instead, memory had to rely 
exclusively on featural representations. 
Taken together, the results of the present experiments propose a dual-code view that 
both configural and featural processing contribute to face recognition. For novel faces 
configural processing is not as powerful as featural processing, therefore featural information 
plays a predominant role when processing novel faces. 
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3. Face Imagery Is Based on Featural Representations 
Abstract 
The role of featural and configural representations in face imagery and face perception 
was investigated using blurred and scrambled faces. By means of blurring, featural 
information is hampered; by scrambling a face into its constituent parts configural 
information is lost. Prior to the experiment ten faces (5 female, 5 male) were learned 
together with the sound of a name. In the imagery condition a name was presented and 
participants were required to imagine the corresponding face as clearly and vividly as 
possible. Then, either a blurred or scrambled face was displayed. In the perception 
condition a scrambled or blurred face and a name were presented simultaneously, thus no 
facilitation via mental imagery was possible. In both conditions participants had to decide 
whether the name belonged to the face or not. Analyses of the hit values showed that in 
the imagery condition scrambled faces were recognized significantly better than blurred 
faces whereas there was no such effect for the perception condition. The results suggest 
that face imagery is based predominantly on featural representations whereas perceiving 
a learned face relies on both featural and configural representations. 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Imagine your history teacher back in your old schooldays. It may be a long time, but 
still the teacher’s face can be imagined quite vividly. The pointed nose, the bushy eyebrows 
behind those shell-rimmed glasses, the thin hair are unforgettable. Needless to say that it feels 
different when we actually look at a photograph of this teacher as it may be shown around 
during the next class reunion. But what exactly is the difference? A striking distinction 
concerns the source that triggers a percept or a mental image. A percept has its origin in the 
stimulus whereas a mental image is evoked internally, based on previously memorized 
information. Therefore, it has often been suggested that images never give an impression of 
novelty, because we already know what we imagine. Other in perception: perception can 
teach me new things. In his work on the imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre puts it this way: “if I give 
myself in image the page of a book, I am in the attitude of the reader, I look at the printed 
lines. But I do not read. And, at the bottom, I am not even looking, because I already know 
what is written” (Sartre, 1940, trans. 2004, p 10). In the context of face recognition this means 
that when I imagine my former teacher I will not have to undergo any recognition. The 
identity of the face is already known prior to the generation of the image. In contrast, when I 
see him on the street I will have to decide whether it is really him or not. 
Despite these apparent differences various neuro-imaging studies on mental imagery of 
faces suggest that visual imagery evokes – at least partly - similar activation as when the faces 
are in fact perceived (Farah et al., 1988; Ishai et al., 2002; Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 
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2000). In an fMRI study, Ishai and colleagues (Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000) found 
content-related activation in extra-striate cortex and ventral temporal cortex when the 
participants visually imagined faces, houses, and chairs. It is noteworthy, however, that Ishai 
et al. (2000) also found some activity restricted to visual imagery in parietal and frontal cortex 
(see also Mechelli, Price, Friston, & Ishai, 2004).  
Further evidence that imagery and perception of faces underlie similar neural 
mechanisms comes from case studies with prosopagnosic patients, which revealed that an 
impairment of face recognition is often accompanied with the disability to mentally visualize 
faces (Charcot & Bernard, 1883; Young et al., 1994; Young & Van De Wal, 1996). Some 
reports, however, have described prosopagnosic patients with intact face imagery (e.g., 
Bodamer, 1947; Pallis, 1955). 
To further elicit the relation between imagery and perception of faces, Cabeza and 
colleagues (Cabeza, Burton, Kelly, & Akamatsu, 1997) conducted a priming study with 
healthy participants. They found that imagined faces prime imagined faces and seen faces 
prime seen faces, but they found no priming between seen and imagined faces. This led the 
authors to the conclusion that imagery is not merely a weak form of perception, thus 
favouring a view that imagery and perception rely on partly distinct processes. However, their 
perception and imagery conditions were not directly comparable. While they used a 
familiarity judgement as perception task, a speeded imagery test was used for the imagery 
task in which participants had to make judgements about the appearance of celebrities. The 
missing priming effect between seen and imagined faces may therefore be a result of task 
inconsistency. Moreover, Cabeza et al. (1997) only analysed response latencies because their 
design did not allow for any statement concerning accuracy. I will come back to this issue in 
the discussion section. 
Taken together, a wealth of knowledge suggests that face imagery and face perception 
involve partly the same neural mechanisms (e.g., Farah et al., 1988; Ishai et al., 2002; Ishai, 
Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000). It has to be noted, however, that the number of studies on face 
perception and face imagery is not balanced; far more studies have investigated face 
perception. Many of these studies differentiate between processing of configural and featural 
face information (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2003; Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Farah et al., 1995; Farah et 
al., 1998; Schwaninger et al., 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; see also chapter 2). Featural 
information is referred to the constituent elements of a face (i.e., eyes, nose, mouth) whereas 
configural information is understood as the spatial relationship between these parts. Many 
authors have provided evidence that featural and configural information can be activated 
independently to recognise faces (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2003; Schwaninger et al., 2002) and it 
has been suggested that configural information plays a dominant role in face perception (e.g., 
Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah et al., 1995; Farah et al., 1998; 
Schwaninger et al., 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). 
Assuming that perception and mental imagery indeed share some common mechanisms, 
I pursued the aim to investigate whether in mental imagery of faces configural and featural 
information can be similarly dissociated. Indeed, Ishai and colleagues (Ishai et al., 2002) 
found differential activation when participants attended to the features or the whole of 
imagined faces. Specifically, they found increased activation in the right intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) when participants focussed on the features of the 
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imagined face. This finding suggests that a dissociated neural mechanism processes featural 
information. While in perception configural information seems to play a predominant role, at 
least for familiar face recognition (e.g., Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Diamond & Carey, 1986; 
Farah et al., 1995; Farah et al., 1998; Schwaninger et al., 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993), this 
might not be the case in mental imagery. People asked to imagine a familiar face most likely 
describe the face by the features and not by configural characteristics. Much more likely they 
would mention the bushy eyebrows and the thin hair of the history teacher rather than the 
configural characteristics, such as his inter-eye distance is ¾ the distance between his mouth 
and eyes. However, when asked to verbally describe a mental image, people are likely to 
characterize a visual mental image of a face as fuzzy or blurred, suggesting that people may 
not be able to activate in imagery precise representations of facial parts after all. 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate featural and configural 
representations in mental imagery and compare them to the role they play in perception. The 
importance of configural and featural representations in mental imagery and perception was 
ascertained by testing face recognition by means of scrambled and blurred stimuli. By 
scrambling the constituent parts of a face, global configural information contained in the face 
is destroyed. By blurring a face the detail featural information contained in the parts is 
hampered. These manipulations enable independent investigation of featural and configural 
information. I ascertained whether a mental image of a face primes featural or configural 
information, or both. 
 
 
3.2 Experiment 4 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four healthy participants (12 male / 12 female) ranging in age between 19 and 33 
years (mean 25 years) took part in this experiment. Four participants reported to be left 
handed and all had normal or corrected to normal vision. All participants gave informed 
consent and were either paid for their participation or received course credits. The participants 
were treated according to the Declaration of Helsinki (1991). 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus 
The study was run on a 15.1” Pentium 4 portable Computer using Superlab Pro 2.0.2 running 
on Windows NT. The experiment took place in a quiet, dimly lit room. The participants were 
seated in a height-adjustable chair at a distance of 500 mm which was maintained by a 
headrest.  They responded by using a Cedrus© Response Pad (RB-520). Each stimulus face 
appeared 95 mm wide and 125 mm high and thus subtended a visual angle of approximately 
9.5° horizontally. 
3.2.1.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli were created from photographs of faces taken at the University of Zurich. The 
photographs were taken frontally and the faces were of a neutral expression. All faces were 
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scaled to a standard size of 300 pixels across the width of the face at pupil level. The intact 
stimuli were cut out with an elliptic tool provided by Adobe Photoshop 7.0 using soft 
contours (5 pixel feather). Thus the outer features of the faces such as head shape and hair line 
were discarded and all the faces appeared at the same size and shape (296 pixels x 385 
pixels). The target stimuli were given five letter names (e.g., Peter), which were presented 
acoustically and visually during the study phase. The names were typed in bold letters below 
the face. Figure 1 shows an example of an intact stimulus. 
The blurred stimuli were created in two steps. First, colour information was discarded in 
the photographs. In a second step the faces were blurred using a Gaussian filter with a sigma 
of 0.025 of image width in frequency space, using the following equation exp(-f2 / 
(2*sigma2)). Using the same elliptic tool as for the intact stimuli the outer features were 
discarded. Thus the blurred stimuli were the same size and shape as the intact stimuli. An 
example of a blurred stimulus is shown in Figure 1. 
Scrambled stimuli were created from the intact faces in following steps. Eyes, mouth 
and nose were cut out with the elliptic tool described above (eyes: 131 pixels x 95 pixels, 
mouth 160 x 82, nose 98 x 145 pixels). These features were placed on a grey background and 
scrambled in four different versions. Each version was arranged so that no part was situated in 
its natural relation to its neighbouring part. The scrambled features were placed within the 
same area as the intact and blurred stimuli, so they subtended to the same visual angle. An 
example of a scrambled stimulus can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
3.2.1.4 Task and Procedure 
The participants were given written and oral instructions. Prior to the experiment they 
underwent a demonstration version of the experiment, which consisted of shortened versions 
of the blocks described below. None of the stimuli used in the demonstration trials appeared 
in the experiment proper. The experiment started with a learning block. Participants learned 
the names of ten target faces. 
Each face was successively 
presented together with a 
name (e.g. “Peter”). The name 
was presented acoustically via 
headphones and visually in 
bold letters below the face. 
Participants were told to 
precisely memorize the face 
with its name so that they can 
later form a mental image that 
matches the original as 
precisely as possible. Half of 
the target faces were female, 
the other half male. The face 
or
„Imagine
Peter“
or
yes – no 
decisionButton 
press
or
„Peter“
„Doris“
Button 
press
yes – no 
decision
Button 
press
Perception Condition
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X
t
t
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„learn name and face“
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Figure 8: Examples of trials in the study phase, imagery and perception 
conditions. Italic words were presented acoustically. 
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was visible until a button was pressed. Then the screen went blank during which the 
participants were told to hold on to the image. As soon as the mental image started to fade, 
participants pressed the button again and the face reappeared and participants could correct 
and consolidate their image. On another button press the face disappeared anew and a fixation 
cross appearing for two seconds signalized the appearance of the next target face. A minimum 
of two study phases were carried out. To make sure that the participants learned the faces 
sufficiently, a naming task was carried out after the study phase. All target faces were 
presented subsequently and the participants had to name each face. If participants did not 
name all faces correctly a further study session was accomplished, until all ten faces were 
named correctly. To further practice mental imagery of faces another training block was 
included (imagery practice block). In this block each trial started with a fixation cross 
appearing for 1 second. Then a name was presented via headphones together with an oval 
shape indicating the array in which the face was to be imagined. Participants were requested 
to visualize the appropriate face as vividly as possible and fit the image onto the grey array. 
When the image was generated participants pressed a button, what made a small dot appear 
within the oval shape. This dot was either at the exact location where eye, nose or mouth 
would appear or 1 cm lower or higher than the feature. The participants then had to decide 
whether or not this dot would appear on a facial feature (eyes, nose, mouth) of the imagined 
face. As the location of the dot was determined individually for each face, the task required a 
highly accurate and vivid visual image of each face. After each answer the appropriate face 
appeared together with the dot, thus the participants were given direct feedback on their 
answers. This feedback enabled the participants to correct their mental image. 
The experiment proper consisted of an imagery block (imagery condition) and a 
perception block (perception condition). The order of these blocks was counterbalanced 
across participants. The imagery condition was comparable to the imagery practice block, 
except that instead of the red dot either a blurred or a scrambled face appeared for one second. 
In a yes/no decision task participants had to decide whether the scrambled or blurred face 
corresponded to the face they imagined or not. In half of the trials the face and the name 
corresponded, in the other half name and face did not correspond. To control whether 
participants really mentally visualized the faces, ten tasks of the imagery practice block were 
included at random intervals, and participants had to decide whether or not the dot would 
appear on the location of the left or right eye, nose, or mouth, were it visually presented. 
In the perception condition a trial started with a fixation cross followed by a blurred or 
scrambled face. At the same time, a name was presented via headphones. The task was to 
decide as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the presented name belonged to the 
blurred or scrambled face. As in the imagery condition half of the trials were same and half 
were different. The experimental design is shown in Figure 1. After the experiment 
participants completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ, Marks, 1973). 
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3.2.2 Results 
Accuracy: The number of correctly matched faces was analysed. In the imagery 
condition the mean hit rate was 88.3% for scrambled faces and 67.9% for blurred faces. In the 
perception condition the mean hit rate was 75.0% for scrambled faces and 69.6% for blurred 
faces. The mean hit rates are depicted in Figure 2. A 2 (imagery, perception) x 2 (scrambled, 
blurred) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) of the hit rates 
revealed a significant effect of 
information (scrambled, 
blurred), F(1,23) = 19.005, 
MSE = 0.021, p < .001. There 
was no main effect of 
condition, but condition and 
information interacted, 
F(1,23) = 8.171, MSE = 
0.017, p < .01. Post-hoc t-tests 
(two-tailed) revealed that 
scrambled trials did not differ 
from blurred trials in the perception condition, but differed significantly in the imagery 
condition, t = 5.086, p < .001. Furthermore, the hit rates of blurred trials did not differ in the 
two conditions, but scrambled trials showed significantly higher hit rates in the imagery 
condition than in the perception condition, t = 2.693, p < .05. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Perception Imagery
p=.178 p<.001
Hits
scrambledblurred scrambledblurred
Figure 9: Mean d’ values for scrambled and blurred trials. Left panel 
= perception condition, right panel = imagery condition. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
 
 
Reaction Times: Reaction times (RTs) that were 3000 ms or longer were treated as 
outliers and were not included in the analyses. Thus, less than 1.8 % of the trials in the 
imagery condition were excluded and less than 1.9% of the trials were excluded in the 
perception condition. Also, only RTs of correct answers were considered. In the imagery 
condition the mean RT was 1762 ms for blurred faces and 1721 ms for scrambled faces. In the 
perception condition the mean RT was 1739 ms for blurred faces and 1766 ms for scrambled 
faces. A 2 x 2 ANOVA of the RTs revealed no significant effects, neither for condition 
(imagery, perception), F(1,23) = 0.024, MSE = 120362, p = .878, nor for information 
(scrambled, blurred), F(1,23) = 0.03, MSE = 37546, p = .865. There was no interaction of 
condition x information. This finding suggests that there was no speed accuracy trade-off. 
Control Condition: To ascertain whether participants were able to form a mental image 
of the test faces the d’ values of the control condition were calculated by subtracting the z-
transformed false alarm rates from the z-transformed hit rates. The mean d’ value in the 
control condition of the experiment was 0.84 (SEM = .35).  A one-sample t-test revealed that 
the d’ values differed significantly from 0, T (23) = 2.413, p < .05, indicating that participants 
performed above chance level. The control condition was designed specifically to assess 
participants’ performance in accurately visualizing the faces.  
Questionnaires: The mean VVIQ scores ranged from 1.56 (clear and reasonably vivid 
image) to 3.31 (moderately clear and vivid image). Rating 1 indicated an image that is 
‘perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision’, and rating 5 indicated ‘no image at all, you 
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only “know” that you are thinking of an object’. The VVIQ scores neither correlated with the 
d’ values of the control condition, r(24) = .293, p = .165, nor with the hit rates of the blurred 
imagery condition, r(24) = .034, p = .875. But the VVIQ scores correlated with the hit rates of 
the scrambled imagery condition, r(24) = -.449, p < .05.  
 
 
3.3 Discussion 
The most important finding of Experiment 4 was that face imagery led to higher 
recognition rates for scrambled than for blurred faces. In the perception condition there was 
no difference between scrambled and blurred faces. This suggests that recognizing blurred 
and scrambled faces was equally difficult. However, the advantage found here for scrambled 
faces in the imagery condition suggests that top-down activation of faces predominantly 
primes featural representations. While in perception configural and featural processes are of 
comparable importance, mental imagery seems to activate featural more than configural 
representations. This assumption is further underlined by the correlation of the VVIQ scores 
and the hit rates of the scrambled imagery condition. The better the imagery abilities, as 
assessed with the VVIQ, the higher hit rates were for scrambled faces in the imagery 
condition. 
Using introspection we may intuitively describe a mental image as blurred or fuzzy, as 
has accurately been described by Sartre in his important work The Imaginary (1940, trans. 
2004). While trying to remember the face of his friend Pierre, Sartre finds that the face “is 
very imperfectly attained: some details are lacking (…) the whole is rather blurred” (p. 17). 
Only a photograph of Pierre can bring back to memory the featural details of the face. In 
contrast to this phenomenological description my findings suggest that introspection may 
misguide us in the search of the true nature that underlies visual mental images. Scrambled 
faces were recognized more accurately than blurred faces, indicating that rather than a blurred 
image we in fact activate relatively detailed featural representations when we imagine a face. 
Perception and imagery apparently differ in the way that imagery only rarely involves 
any recognition, whereas perception always goes along with recognition. In this study I was 
interested whether a mental image of a face differentially primes configural and featural 
information and compared the results from the imagery condition with those from the 
perception condition. Insofar, in both the imagery condition and the perception condition 
participants had to match a name of a learned face with a presented face, albeit in the imagery 
condition they generated a mental image of the face before answering. Interestingly, there was 
no main effect of condition, neither for the hit rates nor for the RTs suggesting no overall 
facilitation through imagery. However, the significant interaction of condition and 
information indicates that mental images of faces do not activate configural representations as 
much as featural representations. 
In contrast to Cabeza and colleagues (Cabeza et al., 1997) I found that imagery can 
indeed prime recognition of faces. But imagery essentially primes featural information: I 
found higher accuracy for scrambled faces in the imagery than in the perception condition. 
Blurred faces, however, were recognized equally well, whether or not a visual image of the 
face could be formed beforehand. Contrary to this study, Cabeza and colleagues did not 
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differentiate between configural and featural representations. Had they included a task 
involving featural information, they might have found a priming effect of face imagery on 
face perception. Furthermore, their data analysis was restricted to response latencies. While 
the response times revealed no significant effects in the present study, response accuracy did. 
Finally, the tasks in the imagery and perception condition in Cabeza et al.’s study were 
inconsistent. In the present study the tasks were the same with the only difference being the 
mental image of the face, which was generated before the face stimuli were visually 
presented. 
It has to be noted, however, that almost 70% of the blurred trials in the imagery 
condition were correctly recognized. I therefore do not claim that imagery fails to activate 
configural representations, but argue that when asked to spontaneously form a visual image of 
a newly learnt face people tend to activate featural more than configural information. Had 
participants been asked to specifically activate configural representations of a face (e.g., 
whose eyes are closer together, Peter’s or David’s) it is possible that configural 
representations could play a more important role. 
The present results provide evidence that featural and configural processing can be 
differentiated in mental imagery. This goes along with findings revealed by means of neuro-
imaging (Ishai et al., 2002). Moreover, the difference between featural and configural 
processing in face imagery may help to better understand inconsistent reports of 
prosopagnosic patients. Some people with prosopagnosia report no difficulties in forming 
mental images of faces they know (e.g. Bodamer, 1947; Pallis, 1955), while others report a 
disability to mentally visualize faces (e.g., Charcot & Bernard, 1883; Young et al. 1994). It 
may be possible that in the former group of patients the lesion affects only perception-driven 
activation of face representations while a top-down activation of featural representations is 
still possible. In the latter group, however, it is possible that top-down and perception-driven 
activation of face representations are equally affected by the lesion. It will have to be the issue 
of future brain-imaging studies with patients suffering from prosopagnosia with or without 
impaired imagery abilities to substantiate this proposition. 
Another interesting issue is to discuss my findings against the background of studies on 
the verbal overshadowing effect. The term verbal overshadowing effect describes the 
phenomenon that people recognized faces less accurately when they previously described the 
face verbally (Dodson, Johnson, & Schooler, 1997; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).  
Macrae and Lewis (2002) found that when participants adopt a local processing strategy (i.e., 
pay more attention to featural information), recognition of newly learned faces is impaired. 
Their finding suggests that not the verbal description per se hampers later recognition of 
faces, but the processing strategy adopted when describing a face. Describing a face verbally 
activates a local processing strategy, as faces are most often described by the features. The 
findings of Experiment 4 suggest that, similar to verbal description, a mental image of a face 
will activate featural representations. These findings could therefore have practical 
implications for criminal investigations when trying to find an offender based on the 
descriptions of eye witnesses. Because mental imagery of a face seems to mainly activate 
featural information, it will be the features that come to mind when witnesses are asked to 
remember the face of the person they saw committing a crime. Photofit pictures used by the 
police meet these concerns, as the faces are built up from different face parts. However, the 
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verbal overshadowing effect suggests that an activation of the features later leads to impaired 
recognition of the face. Taking the findings of Macrae and Lewis together with my findings 
suggests that forensic psychologists have to be careful about the accuracy of the descriptions 
of witnesses and their ability to recognise the offender in a later line-up. 
In conclusion, I found that although featural and configural processes can be separately 
activated in both mental imagery and perception, mental imagery seems to particularly 
activate featural representations. While performance in configural and featural trials was 
comparable in the perception condition, the importance of featural information was higher in 
face imagery. This finding suggests that imagery of faces activates featural representations 
more accurately than configural representations. In perception configural and featural 
representations played an equal role. 
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4. The Thatcher Illusion: Rotating the Viewer instead of 
the Picture 
 
Abstract 
Faces are difficult to recognize when presented upside down. This effect of face inversion 
was effectively demonstrated with the “Thatcher illusion” by Thompson (1980). It has 
been tacitly assumed that this effect is due to inversion relative to retinal coordinates. 
Here I tested whether this effect is due to egocentric (i.e. retinal) inversion or whether the 
orientation of the body respective to gravity also influences the face inversion effect. 
Using a 3D human turntable subjects were tested in five different body tilt (roll) 
orientations: 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180°. The stimuli consisted of 4 “normal” and 4 
“thatcherized” faces and were presented in 8 different orientations in the picture plane. 
The subjects had to decide in a yes-no task whether the faces were “normal” or 
“thatcherized”. Analysis of the d-prime values revealed a significant effect of stimulus 
orientation, and of body tilt. The significant effect of body tilt was due to a drop in d-
prime values in the 135° orientation. This result is compared to findings of studies 
investigating the subjective visual vertical, where larger errors occurred in body tilt 
orientations between 90° and 180°. The present findings suggest that the face inversion 
effect mainly relies on retinal coordinates, but that in head-down body tilt orientations 
around 135° the gravitational reference frame has an arduous influence on the perception 
of faces. 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Visual objects are difficult to recognize when presented upside down. The effect of 
inversion differs depending on the type of visual stimuli, faces showing a significantly larger 
inversion effect than objects (Yin, 1969; for an overview see Valentine, 1988). A widely 
accepted explanation for this discrepancy goes back to the distinction between featural and 
configural information (e.g., Leder & Bruce, 2000). Featural information refers to information 
that is contained in the local parts (e.g., the individual shape of the nose); configural 
information refers to the spatial arrangement of the parts (e.g., the distance between the eyes 
and the mouth). In faces configural information plays a dominant role, while object 
recognition is much more based on local information contained in the features (Biederman, 
1987; Marr, 1982; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984). Configural information has been shown to 
be more orientation sensitive than featural information (e.g., Leder et al., 2001; Nachson & 
Shechory, 2002; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996), and therefore face recognition is hampered when 
faces are presented upside-down. In this orientation, faces can only be recognized by 
matching their parts (Rock, 1973). Thompson (1980) effectively demonstrated that different 
orientation sensitivity of features and configurations may be responsible for the face inversion 
effect (FIE). He took a photograph of the former British prime minister and inverted eyes and 
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mouth with respect to the whole face. Such a face looks extremely grotesque when viewed 
right-side up, but loses this grotesqueness when the face is inverted. This effect is now 
commonly referred to as Thatcher illusion. A possible explanation for this effect has been 
provided by Rock (1973). Recognition of such an inverted „thatcherized” face requires 
featural and configural information to be rotated mentally. Yet, the spatial transformation of 
all features and configurations overtaxes the capacity of the underlying mechanism (cf. Rock, 
1973). Therefore it is difficult to mentally visualize what an inverted thatcherized face would 
look like right side up. The closer the orientation to upright the better the configural 
information can be extracted from the face. Numerous studies have been concerned with this 
phenomenon since then (e.g., Lewis, 2001; Rakover, 1999; Sturzel & Spillmann, 2000; 
Valentine & Bruce, 1985). Sturzel and Spillmann (2000) gradually turned different 
thatcherized faces from 0° through 180° and asked participants to report when the face 
switched from pleasant to grotesque, or vice versa. They found a relatively narrow 
changeover-zone between 97.2° and 118.3° where the change of expression occurred. Sturzel 
and Spillmann suggested that the striking change may be based on the step-tuning properties 
of hypothetical face neurons, rather than a gradual tuning curve. According to Sturzel and 
Spillmann face neurons respond best to faces in a tuning width of ±100° relative to the 
vertical. They claim that these face neurons may also respond to inverted faces, but 
inappropriately. In contrast, Lewis (2001) reported a gradual loss of configural information 
the further a face is turned away from upright. He recorded the reaction times of 40 
participants while they discriminated thatcherized from normal faces which were presented in 
10 different orientations. Based on these two studies, however, the nature of the dependence 
on the rotation-angle still remains equivocal. 
Interestingly, almost all studies on the FIE have in common that they were conducted 
with upright observers. Therefore, it is often tacitly assumed that the effects induced by 
inverted stimuli are defined with respect to retinal coordinates. However, a stimulus can be 
upright or inverted with respect to retinal coordinates, or with respect to gravitational 
coordinates. Even though we are upright most of the time it is not evident that the reference 
frame underlying the FIE is of purely retinal origin. It is possible that it also depends on the 
orientation of the face stimulus with respect to the direction of gravity, since influence of 
extra-retinal information has been found in object recognition (Simons, Wang, & 
Roddenberry, 2002). In everyday life we mainly see faces in a gravitationally upright 
orientation, so it is plausible to assume that the direction of gravity can be implicitly encoded 
when faces are learned. In the upright body orientation, however, we are unable to disentangle 
the role of gravitational and retinal information because the two frames of reference are fully 
aligned. To investigate the influence of the gravitational frame of reference it is therefore 
inevitable to test participants not only in the upright body orientation but also when they are 
tilted. 
The fact that body tilt can influence visual perception has already been demonstrated by 
Rock (1973). A square tilted 45° was no longer perceived as a square, but as a diamond. 
However, when the subject was tilted 45° and the square remained upright (resulting in 
roughly the same retinal image) subjects reported to see a square. Gaunet and Berthoz (2000) 
investigated the effect of gravity on the recognition of spatial environment. Their participants 
were tested upright and tilted 33° to the left and right. The task was to recognize 
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photographed scenes, which were tilted in 15° steps from 0° to 90°. In contrast to Rock 
(1973) they found that gravity was only slightly important for recognizing scenes, and 
concluded that in their task it played no crucial role. Recent work by Clément and Eckhardt 
(2005) suggested that visual illusions such as the Ponzo illusion occurred less frequently 
when participants were lying on their side or supine compared to upright. In contrast, a study 
by Prinzmetal and Beck (2001) showed that the effect of visual illusions was in fact increased 
when observers were tilted 30°. Lipshits and McIntyre (1999) suggested a multi-sensory 
reference frame for the internal representation of visual stimuli. They showed a sequence of 
two lines of equal length which differed in orientation. The task was to memorize the 
orientation of the first line (reference line) and rotate the second line to the same orientation 
as the reference line, using a rotary knob. In the upright body orientation there was a clear 
advantage for reference lines that were horizontal and vertical (oblique effect). However, this 
preference disappeared when the lines were in fact presented retinally horizontal and vertical, 
but the participants were tilted 22.5° to the left or right. Using the same task under 
microgravity conditions (0g) the same preference as in upright body orientation was found 
(Lipshits, Bengoetxea, Cheron, & McIntyre, 2005). These findings suggest that visual stimuli 
may be stored in a multimodal frame of reference that includes information about gravity, but 
that in the absence of gravity the retinal reference frame suffices to determine the oblique 
effect. Buchanan-Smith and Heeley (1993) provided further evidence that the oblique effect 
cannot simply be explained by the retinal reference frame. 
Moreover, tasks involving mental image transformations have also been shown to 
depend on body orientation. Corballis and colleagues (Corballis, Nagourney, Shetzer, & 
Stefanatos, 1978) tested participants in upright orientation, and when they were tilted 60° and 
90° to the side and found that in a mental rotation task using alphanumeric and letter-like 
symbols as stimuli the gravitational reference frame indeed had an influence. Specifically, 
they found that “upright” is more aligned with the gravitational vertical than with the retinal 
vertical. Mast, Ganis, Christie, and Kosslyn (2003) investigated the performance in four 
different mental imagery tasks while participants were upright, horizontal, or supine. They 
found an influence of body orientation in two imagery tasks, suggesting that body tilt 
influences at least some processes associated with mental imagery. 
Does body orientation have an influence on face recognition? On the basis of the 
findings reported above it can be hypothesized that the direction of gravity may also have an 
influence on the perception of faces. In particular, the visual illusions used in the studies by 
Prinzmetal and Beck (2001) and Clément and Eckardt (2005) are indeed visual stimuli 
involving predominantly configural processing. Since the FIE is based widely on the 
processing of configural information it is possible that it is also affected by body tilt. To my 
knowledge, only one study has yet been conducted to investigate the FIE in different body tilt 
orientations. Troje (2003) reported no changes depending on the body orientation and 
concluded that the retinal frame of reference is responsible for the FIE. However, this study 
only investigated observers that were upright and lying 90° on the side. Therefore, it seems 
premature to draw conclusions that are based on only one body tilt orientation. It is now 
important to study the FIE in a wider range of body tilt angles. In the present study I made use 
of the Thatcher illusion to investigate the FIE. I investigated whether body tilt influences the 
Thatcher illusion, or whether it can be fully explained by stimulus orientation with respect to 
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retinal coordinates. Using different body tilts the gravitational and retinal frame of reference 
was disentangled. If indeed these the gravitational reference frame influences the Thatcher 
illusion, a differential effect of body tilt on stimulus orientation would be expected. If the 
Thatcher illusion is only based on retinal coordinates no effect of body tilt would be expected. 
 
 
4.2 Experiment 5 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirteen participants ranging in age between 25 and 34 years voluntarily took part in this 
experiment. All but two participants reported to be right-handed. They could choose whether 
they wanted to be paid for participation or to receive course credits. All had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. Informed consent for participation was given prior to the 
experiment and the study was approved according to the Declaration of Helsinki (1991). 
4.2.1.2 Stimuli 
Four faces provided by the Max-Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, 
Germany served as stimuli. The thatcherized stimuli were prepared using Adobe Photoshop©. 
With the elliptic tool, the eyes and mouth were cut out using a soft-contour feather of 5 pixels 
and were mirror-reversed round the horizontal axis. A sample stimulus can be seen in Figure 
1. Then each face was rotated in the picture plane into the 8 different angles of stimulus 
orientation (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, and 315°). 
In a pilot study a separate group of nine participants was tested outside the turntable in 
upright body orientation using the upright (0°) and inverted (180°) stimuli described above. 
The effect of stimulus orientation for accuracy was significant, F(1,4) = 9.765, MSE = 4.925, 
p < .05, showing that inverted 
thatcherized faces were not 
detected as accurately as 
upright thatcherized faces. 
The result of this pre-test 
demonstrated that the stimuli 
are appropriate for testing the 
FIE. 
 
4.2.1.3 Apparatus  
The participants were tested 
in five different body tilt 
orientations (roll), 0° 
(upright), 45°, 90° 
(horizontal, right ear down), 
135°, 180° (upside down). 
Task: „normal“ or „thatcherized“ ?
8 Stimulus orientations in 5 body-tilt positions
 
Figure 10: Design and sample stimulus: In each of 5 body tilt 
orientations 4 thatcherized and normal faces were presented in 8 
stimulus orientations. 
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The face stimuli appeared in eight different orientations (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, 
and 315°). Thus, 8 x 5 combinations were possible per stimulus. Four different individual 
faces were used which appeared in a thatcherized and a normal version. In total, 320 different 
trials were applied (8 x 5 x 8). The experiment was run using a 3D human turntable 
(Acutronik, Jona, Switzerland) at the Department of Neurology, University Hospital Zurich. 
The turntable consisted of three servo-controlled motor driven axes which could be separately 
controlled. 
The participants were seated on a chair mounted on the 3D human turntable and firmly 
secured with safety belts. Participant’s naso-occipital axis was aligned with the centre of 
rotation. The head was restrained with a thermoplastic mask (Sinmed BV, Reeuwijk, The 
Netherlands), which was individually moulded for each participant. The mask was attached to 
the back of the chair ensuring effective restraint of the head without discomfort. This fixation 
in combination with the belts ensured a stable position in head-down body tilts. The 
participants were brought to one of the four body tilt orientations (45°, 90°, 135° or 180°) 
with a speed of 45°/s and an acceleration of 45°/s2. After a delay of 2 s the participants were 
prompted to start the first trial by pressing one of the response buttons. Jaggi-Schwarz and 
Hess (2003; personal communication with Hess) found no torsional nystagmus (VOR) two 
seconds after stopping the body rotation at this speed. Therefore, this interval is long enough 
for vestibular driven eye movements to dissipate, which could interfere with the perceptual 
encoding of the face stimuli. The stimuli were presented via a Macintosh G3 Powerbook 
which was mounted onto a frame attached to the chair, using PsyScope software (Cohen, 
MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). The participants responded by using a PsyScope 
button box which was attached to the frame. Reaction times and button presses were recorded. 
 
4.2.1.4 Design 
A within-subjects design was used. Participants completed two blocks of 32 trials in each 
body orientation, encompassing all stimulus orientations and faces, but each face appeared 
either normal or thatcherized. Whether a face was thatcherized or normal was pseudo-
randomized with the constraint that half of the stimulus orientations of each face were 
thatcherized and half were normal. Thatcherization was counterbalanced within-subjects 
between blocks. The order of body tilt orientations was attained as follows: Four random 
orders of the five body orientations were created. Using Latin squares, five orders were 
generated from each random order. Thus, 20 orders were computed. Each participant 
underwent two orders of body orientations. The order of the trials in each block was 
randomized online. 
 45
Featural and configural face representations 
 
4.2.1.5 Task and Procedure 
The participants were given written and oral instructions. The task was to decide 
whether a face was “normal” or “thatcherized” by pushing the corresponding key on the 
response box. The participants were tilted into one of five body orientations and were then 
presented with the first test face. Each test face was presented for 200 ms in one of eight 
stimulus orientations; either normal or thatcherized and the participants had to respond as fast 
and as accurately as possible. After each block the participants were brought back to the 
upright body orientation and 
were able to take a rest. The 
length of the break was self 
paced, but the minimum 
duration was 30 s. As soon as 
the participants were ready 
they were tilted into the next 
body orientation and the 
experiment continued with the 
next block. 
 
 
4.2.2 Analysis 
D-prime values (d’) and 
reaction times (RTs) of the 
correct responses were 
analyzed. Less than 0.8 % of 
the trials were treated as 
outliers and were excluded 
from analysis because RTs 
were above 3000 ms. D-prime 
values were calculated for 
each subject by subtracting 
the z-transformed false alarm 
rate from the z-transformed 
hit rate. First, 5x8 analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) were run 
including all body tilt 
orientations and all stimulus 
orientations. In addition, to investigate the FIE 5x2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) were 
conducted with all five body tilts and upright and inverted face stimuli as within subjects’ 
factors. 
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Figure 11: a) Main effect of stimulus orientation. Mean d-prime 
values of all stimulus orientations independent of body tilt. Error bars 
depict standard errors of the mean (SEM). b) Main effect of body tilt. 
Mean d-prime values of all body tilt orientations for retinally upright 
and inverted stimuli. Error bars depict standard errors of the mean 
(SEM). 
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4.2.3 Results 
The mean d’ values for each body tilt orientation and stimulus orientation are illustrated 
in Figure 2. Figure 2a illustrates the d’ values of all stimulus orientations, independent of 
body tilt, Figure 2b shows the effect of body tilt on d’ for upright and inverted stimuli. The 
5x8 ANOVA on the d’ values revealed a significant effect of body tilt, F(4,48) = 6.307, MSE 
= 1.346, p < .001 and of stimulus orientation, F(7,84) = 39.481, MSE = 3.285, p < .001, and a 
significant body tilt x stimulus orientation interaction, F(28,336) = 1.751, MSE = 2.238, p < 
.05. To specifically investigate the FIE, I computed a 5x2 ANOVA on the d’ values of 
retinally upright and retinally inverted stimuli in all 5 body tilts, which revealed significant 
main effects of body tilt, F(4,48) = 6.24, MSE = 1.56, p < .001, and stimulus orientation, 
F(1,12) = 85.10, MSE = 4.33, p < .001. The interaction (body tilt x stimulus orientation) did 
not reach statistical significance (p = .222). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni 
corrected) revealed that the main effect of body tilt was due to the tilt-angle of 135°. Here, 
participants had lower d’ values. Only comparisons involving the 135° orientation reached 
statistical significance: the 
comparison between 0° and 
135° revealed a significant 
difference (p < .05), and so 
did the comparison between 
90° and 135° (p < .01). The 
comparison between 45° 
and 135° reached marginal 
significance (p = .11), and 
the comparison between 
180° and 135° did not reach 
statistical significance (p = 
.304). 
The mean RTs are 
shown in Figure 3. Figure 
3a illustrates the RTs of all 
stimulus orientations, 
independent of body tilt. 
Figure 3b shows the effect 
of body tilt on the RTs for 
retinally upright and 
inverted stimuli. The 5x8 
ANOVA on the RTs 
revealed a main effect of  
stimulus orientation, F(7,84) 
= 16.709, MSE = 29277, p < 
.001, but neither the main 
effect of body tilt nor the interaction body tilt x stimulus orientation reached statistical 
significance. 
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Figure 12: a) Main effect of stimulus orientation. Mean RTs of all 
stimulus orientations independent of body tilt. Error bars depict standard 
errors of the mean (SEM). b) Main effect of body tilt. Mean RTs of all 
body tilt orientations for retinally upright and inverted stimuli. Error 
bars depict standard errors of the mean (SEM).
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The 5x2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of body tilt, F(4,48) = 3.6, MSE = 22528, p < 
.05. The more participants were turned away from upright the faster they responded. It is 
worth noting that d-prime values did not decrease in the upside-down body orientation, and 
therefore the shorter RTs were not due to a speed-accuracy trade off. The effect of stimulus 
orientation also reached statistical significance, F(1,12) = 18.19, MSE = 85879, p < .01, but 
the interaction (body tilt x stimulus orientation) was not significant (p = .69).  
 
 
 
4.3 Discussion 
Three findings of this experiment deserve special attention. First, the inversion effect 
was generally based on retinal coordinates. Second, when the body was tilted 135°, 
thatcherized faces were more difficult to detect. Third, the further observers were tilted away 
from upright the faster they detected retinally inverted and retinally upright thatcherized faces.  
Faces were more difficult to process when they were retinally inverted than when they 
were retinally upright. In fact, it took participants more time to discriminate thatcherized from 
normal faces the more they were rotated away from retinal upright. This finding is in line with 
the results of Lewis (2001) who reported a gradual increase of RTs with increasing stimulus 
orientation of thatcherized faces. Whereas Lewis (2001) only reported an increase of RTs I 
also found a decrease of d-prime. This finding indicates that configural information gradually 
is hampered the further a face is turned away from retinal upright. The data of Experiment 5 
therefore contradict findings of Sturzel and Spillmann (2000), who reported a relatively 
narrow range of stimulus rotation angle where a thatcherized face loses its grotesqueness. 
They suggested that step-tuning properties of face neurons may be responsible for their 
results. The increasing RTs for rotated faces make it more likely to suggest a mental rotation 
process that underlies the findings from this study. Observers had to mentally rotate each face 
to a retinal upright orientation, and the time to perform this process increased with angle of 
stimulus orientation; at the same time the accuracy decreased. 
Yet another important finding is that the angle of body tilt had an influence on the 
detection of the Thatcher illusion. In particular, at 135° it was more difficult to detect the 
changes in the faces. This finding suggests that gravitational direction indeed has an influence 
on the FIE. It is noteworthy that d’ in the upside down body orientation (180°) did not differ 
from any of the other body orientations, and thus the results are not explainable by a general 
decline in performance caused by head-down orientations. De Schonen et al. (1998) studied 
the FIE in microgravity and found no change when compared to performance on the ground. 
In microgravity, however, there is no sensory information regarding the direction of gravity 
and participants rely exclusively on visual information. Similarly, Troje (2003) reported no 
effect of body orientation on the FIE. However, his study was confined to the use of two 
different body tilt orientations only. When only looking at 0° and 90°, my data confirm the 
findings of Troje (2003). Including a wider range of body tilt orientations revealed that the 
direction of gravity can influence the FIE. Gaunet and Berthoz (2000) tested the influence of 
gravity in a natural scene recognition task. They also only used one small body tilt (i.e., 33°). 
They concluded that gravity is not a crucial factor in their experiment. The present findings 
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suggest that an effect of gravity may indeed have been found in body tilts around 135°. For 
natural scenes the effect of gravity may even exceed the effect I found for faces, because – 
unlike faces – natural scenes always appear gravitationally upright. 
What could be the reason for the distinctive decline in performance at 135°? In this 
context it is interesting to note that studies investigating the subjective visual vertical report 
largest errors in body tilt orientations around 135° (e.g., Kaptein & Van Gisbergen, 2004; 
Schöne, 1964; Udo de Haes, 1970; Van Beuzekom & Van Gisbergen, 2000). Interestingly, 
not only the deviation from the physical vertical but also the variance of the subjective visual 
vertical reached its maximum in head-down body tilts between 120° and 150° (Mast, 2000; 
Mittelstaedt, 1999). This indicates that the participants have less reliable reference 
information for the perception of the vertical. As a consequence, the participants have 
difficulties in judging the orientation of visual stimuli with respect to gravity. The retinal and 
gravitational references are not aligned in 45°, 90° and 135°, but in 135° the deviation 
between the retinal up and the perceived gravitational up is largest. Here, the two references 
deviate by more than 90° (this is also true for the upside down orientation but there the 
reference frames are again aligned, albeit in exactly opposite directions). This disparity may 
result in a reduced confidence in the spatial reference information underlying the FIE and thus 
finally disrupts task performance. 
I assume that the FIE is explainable with retinal coordinates as long as the retinal and 
gravitational frame of reference do not deviate substantially (i.e., deviations larger than 90°). 
No such conflict arises in the upside down orientation where the reference frames are again 
perfectly aligned but point in opposite directions. Therefore, the FIE is essentially the result of 
visual information processing and only in head-down orientations around 135° the extra-
retinal reference information will unfold its effect. In the present study however, only roll 
orientations were tested. It will have to be the aim of future studies to investigate whether 
rotations round other body axes will produce a similar effect (e.g., head down tilts in the body 
pitch direction). The overall interaction of body tilt and stimulus orientation further suggests 
that body tilt has an influence on the perception of orientation-sensitive stimuli such as 
thatcherized faces. Thus, this study demonstrated that a gravity-based component exists and 
can interfere with task performance. 
Finally, it seems that “standing on one’s head” speeds up detection of retinally upright 
and inverted thatcherized faces. Taking the d-prime values into account it is unlikely that 
participants just wanted to get over more quickly with the head-down body conditions, as the 
detection ability of thatcherized faces did not decrease in body tilt orientations of 180°. 
Furthermore, this advantage of being upside-down only applied for retinally upright and 
inverted faces. Whether this finding was specific to the task used in this study and why it only 
occurred for upright and inverted faces will have to be the issue of further studies. As the 
participants in this study stayed in one body tilt orientation for approximately 60 s maximally, 
nothing can be said about the time course for longer time periods. This enhancement may 
eventually decline after a certain time, presumably when the cardio-vascular system has 
regularized the blood pressure.  
In conclusion, Experiment 5 has shown that the Thatcher illusion is based mainly on the 
orientation of the face stimulus with respect to the retinal reference frame. However, in head-
down body tilt orientations around 135° the gravitational and retinal reference frames deviate 
substantially and as a consequence participants have difficulties in unambiguously perceiving 
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the orientation of visual stimuli. This effect was found for faces, whether it also applies for 
other complex visual stimuli will have to be the issue of future studies. 
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5. Is the Thatcher Illusion Restricted to Faces? 
Abstract 
Faces are very sensitive to inversion, which has been effectively demonstrated in the 
Thatcher illusion, where eyes and mouth were inverted within the whole face (Thompson, 
1980). When viewed in an upright orientation such a face looks extremely grotesque, but 
loses this grotesqueness when turned upside down. Here I investigate whether the same 
effect can be found for houses. Analogous to thatcherized faces, I inverted windows and 
doors within whole houses and presented thatcherized houses and faces for 250 ms each 
to 16 participants. Their task was to indicate whether the house or face was normal or 
thatcherized. An ANOVA on the d’ values revealed a significant effect of stimulus type, 
orientation and a significant interaction of stimulus type and orientation. Post-hoc two-
sample t-tests however revealed that inverted thatcherized houses were not detected less 
accurately than upright thatcherized houses. For faces I found the expected Thatcher 
effect. These findings suggest that the Thatcher effect might be unique for faces. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Inverted faces are more difficult to recognize than inverted pictures of other object 
classes (Valentine, 1988; Yin, 1969). That faces are indeed sensitive to inversion was 
effectively demonstrated in the Thatcher illusion (Thompson, 1980). Thompson (1980) 
inverted the eyes and mouth within the face of former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher. When viewed in an upright orientation her facial expression appears extremely 
grotesque, however this grotesqueness disappears when the face is turned upside down. A 
widely accepted explanation for this asymmetry is that configural information is believed to 
be particularly important in face processing (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Farah et al., 1995; 
Tanaka & Sengco, 1997), while objects are processed part-based (Biederman, 1987; Marr, 
1982; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984). Configural information has been considered to be much 
more orientation sensitive than featural information (Leder et al., 2001; Maurer et al., 2002; 
Rock, 1973; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Farah et al., 1995; Yin, 1969), hence a main source of 
information is disrupted when turning a face upside down. 
For this reason, the Thatcher-effect has been traded as face specific. However, Rock 
(Rock, 1988) mentioned a similar effect when inverting individual letters within a whole 
word. Still, this effect is not as striking and allowedly not as strong as found in thatcherized 
faces. Rock’s explanation for this illusion is that an inverted image has to be mentally rotated 
to the upright position in order to perceive the expression on the face. Inverted faces overtax 
mental rotation mechanisms and can therefore only be processed part by part (Rock, 1973, 
1988). And because parts are not sensitive to inversion, one does not succeed in noticing that 
these parts are actually inverted with respect to the whole image. A slightly different 
explanation for the Thatcher illusion is provided by Rakover (1999). He argues that the whole 
face is more dominant than the individual features and interprets the strangeness of upright 
thatcherized faces as a result of our inability to grasp the eyes as locally inverted in the pattern 
of the upright whole face. When inverted, the thatcherized face is perceived as an inverted 
face and the eyes are perceived within this frame in their true orientation: upright eyes. But in 
this inverted case, the whole face is perceptually not as dominant as the individual features, 
because inversion disrupts perception of the whole face (see also Farah et al., 1995). 
Various studies have been conducted scrutinizing the nature of the Thatcher illusion. 
For example, the dependence of the rotation angle has been investigated. Lewis (2001) 
recorded the reaction times of participants while they discriminated thatcherized from normal 
faces which were presented in 10 different orientations and found a general increase the 
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further away faces were turned from upright. In Experiment 5, I found very similar results not 
only for reaction times, but also for d’ values, indicating that configural processing is 
gradually decreased, the further a face is turned away from upright (see also Lobmaier & 
Mast, in press). In contrast, Sturzel and Spillmann (2000) suggested that step-tuning functions 
of hypothetical face neurons may be responsible for this effect. They gradually turned 
different thatcherized faces from 0° to 180° and participants were required to indicate when 
the face switched from pleasant to grotesque. The results suggested a relatively narrow 
change-over zone between 97.2° and 118.3° where the change of expression occurred rather 
than a gradual tuning curve (Sturzel & Spillmann, 2000). According to these authors, face 
neurons may respond inappropriately to inverted faces, resulting in the Thatcher illusion.  
In the present study I investigate whether the Thatcher effect also applies to other 
stimuli that are made up of different parts, but where the configuration of these parts is 
crucially important, similar to the interrelationship of parts and configuration in faces. Houses 
seem to meet these premises, as they are all made up of a certain number of parts (e.g., 
windows, doors, etc.) which are individually arranged. I compared the perception of upright 
and inverted thatcherized faces with upright and inverted thatcherized houses, to ascertain 
whether the Thatcher effect is unique for faces. 
 
 
5.2 Experiment 6 
5.2.1 Method 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
16 Participants (8 female, 8 male) ranging in age from 22 to 49 (mean = 30 years) 
voluntarily took part in the experiment and were naïve to the goal of the Experiment. Four 
participants reported to be left handed. All reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
 
5.2.1.2 Apparatus 
The Experiment was run on a 15.1” Pentium 4 portable Computer using Superlab Pro 
2.0.2 running on Windows NT. The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. The 
participants were seated on a height-adjustable chair and responded by using a Cedrus© 
Response Pad (RB-520). They were required to keep the head still on a head-rest, keeping a 
viewing distance of 500 mm constant. Participants underwent a total of 10 blocks, 5 blocks 
with houses and 5 blocks with faces. Each face stimulus appeared 45 mm wide and 56 mm 
high and thus subtended a visual angle of approximately 5.2° horizontally. The faces were 
placed on a black square (67 x 67 mm) in the centre of the screen.  The house stimuli were 
approximately 62 mm wide and 35 mm high and were placed on a grey rectangular (47 x 67 
mm) in the centre of the screen. The house stimuli subtended to a visual angle of 
approximately 7.1° horizontally.  
5.3.1.3 Stimuli 
Five faces and houses served as stimuli for this experiment. The faces were provided by 
the Max-Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany. Thatcherized 
faces were created by inverting the eyes and mouth within these faces (Thompson, 1980). The 
house stimuli were taken from the house-database of Alumit Ishai, Institute of 
Neuroradiology, University of Zurich, Switzerland. To accomplish “thatcherized” houses, the 
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entrance, windows and garage door were inverted within the house. All stimuli appeared 
either upright or inverted. 
 
5.3.1.4 Task and Procedure 
Each trial began with the appearance of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen, 
followed by a stimulus. Each stimulus was presented for 250 ms and task was to decide as 
accurately and fast as possible whether the stimulus was normal or thatcherized. Participants 
answered with the preferred hand for normal stimuli and with the subdominant hand for 
thatcherized stimuli. After pressing one of the answer-buttons the fixation cross reappeared 
and was presented until participants initiated the next trial by pressing the centre button. The 
inter-trial interval was therefore self-paced; the next stimulus appeared 500 ms after initiating 
a new trial with the centre button. 
Prior to the experiment participants gave informed consent. Then they received written 
and oral instructions which were followed by 16 practice trials, encompassing all 
experimental conditions to make sure they understood the task. None of the stimuli that 
appeared in the practice trials were later used in the experiment proper. In the experiment 
proper participants underwent 5 blocks with 20 face stimuli (5 different faces x 2 thatcherized 
or normal x 2 upright or inverted) each and accordingly, 5 blocks with 20 house stimuli each. 
House blocks alternated with face blocks; which block the experiment began with was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 
5.2.2 Results 
D-prime values and reaction times (RTs) of correct responses were analyzed. D-prime 
values were calculated for each participant and condition by subtracting the z-transformed 
false alarm rates from the z-transformed hit rates. A hit was defined as a correctly detected 
thatcherized stimulus; a false alarm was defined as a stimulus that was normal, but mistakenly 
perceived as thatcherized. The mean d-prime values are shown in Figure 1. The mean d’ value 
for upright faces was 4.01 (SD = 1.198), for inverted faces 1.16 (SD = 1.214), for upright 
houses the mean d-prime value was 1.65 (SD = 1.01) and 1.19 (SD = 0.89) for inverted 
houses. As the independent samples t-test revealed no effect of group, the data of the two 
groups was pooled for the subsequent analyses. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
carried out, with stimulus (face, house) and orientation (upright, inverted) as within subjects 
factors, revealing a 
significant main effect of 
stimulus, F(1,15) = 
29.836, MSE = 0.73, p < 
.001, and of orientation, 
F(1,15) = 222.411, MSE = 
0.197, p < .001.  The 
interaction stimulus x 
orientation was also 
significant, F(1,15) = 
26.878, MSE = 0.847, p < 
.001. A post-hoc two-
sample t-test (two-sided) 
comparing upright with 
inverted stimuli revealed 
that upright thatcherized 
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Figure 13: Mean d’ values for upright and inverted thatcherized faces 
(red) and upright and inverted thatcherized houses (blue). Error bars 
depict standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
 53
Featural and configural face representations 
 
faces were detected significantly better than inverted thatcherized faces, T = 10.391, p < .001. 
The t-test with upright and inverted houses however did not reach statistical significance, T = 
1.971, p = .068. 
The mean RTs for thatcherized stimuli were as follows: for upright thatcherized faces 
685 ms (SD = 179.18 ms), for inverted thatcherized faces 1013.88 ms (SD = 326.63 ms), for 
upright thatcherized houses 1084.94 ms (SD = 287.81 ms) and for inverted thatcherized 
houses 1176.95 ms (SD = 414.4 ms). For normal stimuli the RTs were 766.27 ms (SD = 
328.67 ms) for upright faces, 1001.13 ms (SD = 417.35 ms) for inverted faces, 965.79 ms (SD 
= 388.02 ms) for upright houses, and 1165.17 ms (SD = 406.9 ms) for inverted houses.  A 2 x 
2 x 2 ANOVA with the factors thatcherization (that), stimulus type (stim) and orientation (ori) 
was carried out on the reaction times, revealing a significant effect of stimulus, F(1,15) = 
22.735, MSE = 75527.5, p < .001, and orientation, F(1,15) = 28.599, MSE = 51136.7, p < 
.001, but no significant effect of thatcherization. Whereas the interaction stimulus * 
orientation was significant (F(1.15) = 7.765, MSE = 19104.9, p< .05) all other interactions 
failed to reach statistical significance. Post-hoc t-tests comparing the RTs of inverted and 
upright thatcherized houses and faces revealed that upright thatcherized faces were detected 
faster than inverted thatcherized faces. However, there was no significant difference between 
upright and inverted houses. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
Thatcherized house stimuli were created by inverting entrance, windows and garage 
door within the whole house, similar to thatcherized faces and the ability to detect upright and 
inverted thatcherized houses and faces was compared. For faces the Thatcher-effect was 
generally larger than for houses. This finding is reflected in the significantly higher d-prime 
values and lower RTs for upright faces as compared to inverted faces. Upright houses were 
detected neither more accurately nor faster than inverted houses.  
This finding suggests that the Thatcher illusion might be unique for faces. This is 
interesting, because both houses and faces are made up of different components which are 
distinct in their configural organisation. The Thatcher illusion is a result of the mutual 
interrelation of featural and configural information on the one hand and stimulus orientation 
on the other. Although most houses share common basic parts (e.g., doors, windows, etc.) 
which are configurally organized, the present data suggest that the interrelationship of featural 
and configural information contained in houses behaves differently than the interrelationship 
of features and configuration of faces. Insofar, it seems that face processing has aspects that 
are unique and do not apply for processing of other objects. However, Diamond and Carey 
(1986) have suggested that what makes faces unique is the expertise human beings have with 
them. They found a similar inversion effect when dog breeders looked at photographs of dogs 
of their breed of expertise. Specifically they claimed that a similar processing strategy is 
employed for objects we know well as for faces (see also e.g., Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier 
& Tarr, 1997). It is therefore questionable whether for example architects would have shown 
an effect with thatcherized houses. However, on the basis of the present data it can be said 
that houses are processed mainly part-based and that configural information plays a minor 
role. This is reflected in the fact that there was no effect of inversion for houses, neither for 
the d’prime values, nor for the RTs. Further support for this assumption lies in the finding that 
even upright thatcherized houses were not detected as accurately as upright thatcherized faces. 
This suggests that in upright as well as inverted houses featural information plays a dominant 
role, thus we do not notice the strangeness of inverted windows in an otherwise upright house. 
Whereas there are numerous studies that show how faces are more prone to inversion 
than other objects (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah et al., 1995), to my knowledge 
nobody has investigated the effect of other objects that have been thatcherized by inverting 
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certain parts relative to the whole array. The common finding that inverted objects are 
recognized more accurately than inverted faces (e.g. Yin, 1969), is reflected in the present 
data in the interaction of stimulus type and inversion. With the present experiment I found 
direct evidence that other objects such as houses are processed predominantly on the basis of 
parts.
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6. Are featural and configural face processing strategies 
dissociable? Evidence from an fMRI Study 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study event related fMRI was used to explore processing mechanisms of featural 
and configural face information. In a delayed matching-to-sample task subjects decided 
whether an intact test face matched a precedent scrambled or blurred cue face. By means 
of dividing a face into its constituent parts and scrambling these parts the face loses its 
configural information. Featural information is destroyed by means of blurring. The test 
face induced differential neural activation depending on what information the cue face 
contained. Test faces following scrambled cue faces evoked increased activation in the 
left fusiform gyrus, left parietal lobe and left lingual gyrus, compared to test faces 
following a blurred cue face. Test faces following after blurred cue faces evoked 
increased activation bilaterally in the middle temporal gyrus, compared to test faces 
following scrambled cue faces. Consistent with previous behavioural studies the results 
of this experiment suggest that processing featural and configural face information are 
mediated by dissociated neural systems. This challenges the view that faces are processed 
as unparsed wholes. Rather the findings of this study suggest that featural and configural 
information is extracted and processed following distinct neural pathways before it is 
combined into a whole representation of the face. 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The processes underlying human face recognition have been the subject of numerous 
behavioural and neuro-imaging studies. Most neuro-imaging studies found a brain region in 
the fusiform gyrus which seems to respond specifically to human faces, termed fusiform face 
area (FFA) (Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; Haxby et al., 2001; Ishai, Ungerleider, 
Martin et al., 2000; Ishai et al., 1999; Kanwisher, 2000; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kanwisher et 
al., 1999; Rossion et al., 2003). Many authors claim that, as opposed to objects, faces seem to 
be processed configurally, instead of part based (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Farah et al., 1995; 
Farah et al., 1998; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). The configuration of a face is understood as the 
information contained in the spatial interrelationship of its features. Nevertheless, recent 
studies have pointed out that featural information also plays a role in the processing of faces 
(Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Schwaninger et al., 2002). Further findings suggest that configural 
and featural information are processed following separate pathways (Bartlett et al., 2003; 
Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Rossion et al., 2000; Schwaninger et al., 2002). In a PET study, 
Rossion and colleagues (2000)  found hemispheric differences when their subjects attended to 
featural or configural information. When faces had to be matched according to their 
 56
Featural and configural face representations 
 
configuration, the right middle fusiform gyrus showed more activation than the left 
homologous region. In part-based processing the activation in the right middle fusiform gyrus 
was reduced, but enhanced in the left middle fusiform gyrus. For objects, no such double 
dissociation could be found in these face specific regions. However, for objects hemispheric 
asymmetric activation for configural and featural information was found in the inferior 
parietal lobe and in the superior temporal gyrus (Weissman & Woldorff, 2005) and in the 
occipito-temporal regions (Martinez et al., 1997). In a study with patients with unilateral right 
or left lesions centred in temporal-parietal regions Robertson et al. (1988) found an 
asymmetry for local and global features (Robertson, Lamb, & Knight, 1988). Patients with 
right hemisphere lesions showed better performance in processing local features, patients with 
lesions in the left hemisphere performed better when processing global features. In the present 
study I scrutinize whether configural and featural face processing mechanisms can be 
dissociated. In the study by Rossion and colleagues (2000) subjects had to attend to either 
featural or configural information in a block design. The task was to match face pairs. These 
face pairs either differed in the spacing of the features (configural block) or in the features 
themselves (featural block). The subjects knew in each block what information they had to 
look for. Therefore their results could be the effect of different attention strategies, rather than 
different processes related to the stimuli. In the present study a delayed matching to sample 
task was used applying an event related design. Subjects first saw either a scrambled or a 
blurred face (cue face) and they had to decide whether a subsequent intact face (test face) was 
the same or not. In scrambled faces global configural information is reduced while local 
featural information remains intact. In blurred faces the detail information of the features is 
hampered while the overall configuration of the face is unrestricted (Schwaninger et al., 
2002).  By keeping the test face intact, the visual input of the critical stimulus remained the 
same. What changed was the cued information. Participants could only solve the task by using 
either configural or featural information, depending on the cue face. I expected to find 
differential activation depending on whether a scrambled or a blurred face preceded the test 
face. According to Rossion and colleagues (Rossion et al., 2000) a differential activation 
would be expected within the FFA. Alternatively, if the FFA in fact does reflect the face 
recognition unit (Bruce, 1988; Schwaninger et al., 2002) but is responsible for more holistic 
aspects of face processing, a differentiation between configural and featural processes 
differential activation could be expected earlier in the visual pathway. Similar to the model 
described elsewhere (Schwaninger et al., 2002) it could be conceivable that featural and 
configural information is first processed following two distinct pathways and is then 
combined into a more holistic face representation in the FFA. If so, different assumptions can 
be made about these pathways. On the one hand it could be expected that configural 
(metrical) information is processed via dorsal pathways, whereas featural information is 
processed via ventral pathways analogous to the “what” and “where” system (Haxby et al., 
1991; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). On the other hand a hemispherical difference could be 
expected for featural and configural processing (Martinez et al., 1997; Rossion et al., 2000). 
Yet another possibility is a combination of the two propositions, namely that featural 
information is processed more left-lateralized and ventrally, and configural information is 
processed in the right hemisphere and dorsally. Finally, if faces were processed purely 
holistically (i.e., featural and configural information is not processed following distinct 
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pathways) no differential activation would be expected between test faces following 
scrambled faces and test faces following blurred faces. Differential activation in blurred and 
scrambled trials, however, would suggest differential processing of featural and configural 
information. 
 
 
6.2 Experiment 7 
6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
Fourteen right-handed subjects ranging in age between 24 and 32 years (mean 27.1 years) 
took part in this study. All gave informed consent and were treated according to the 
declaration of Helsinki. All subjects were paid for their participation at the end of the 
experiment. 
6.2.1.2 Stimuli 
Blurred, scrambled and intact faces were used as stimuli. In the control condition lines in four 
different orientations were used, either placed on a black background or on an array the same 
size as the faces. This array was a special scrambled version of a stimulus face, where an 
intact face was cut into small parts and rearranged so that it contained no featural and no 
configural information. Examples of the stimuli can be seen in Figure 1. The stimulation was 
presented via MR-compatible video goggles (MAVision 2000 fMRI, Resonance Technology, 
Inc.). 
6.2.1.3 Task 
The experiment was conducted using Presentation (www.neurobs.com). A trial started with a 
fixation cross, which was 
presented during 3 seconds. In 
the experimental conditions 
either a blurred (cueblr) or a 
scrambled face (cuescr) was 
presented for 5 seconds, 
followed by fixation cross 
(5000 ms) and an intact test 
face. The test face disappeared 
after 2000 ms or as soon as the 
subjects responded. Depending 
on whether a scrambled or 
blurred face preceded this test 
face was coded testscr, or 
testblr, respectively. The task 
was to decide whether the intact 
face was the same person shown 
XX
XX
3 seconds 5 seconds 5 seconds 2 seconds
Experimental 
condition
Control
condition
Figure 14: Design. After a fixation cross either a scrambled or 
blurred face (experimental condition) or a line (control condition) 
was presented for 5 seconds (cue). After a delay an intact face or 
control stimulus was presented (test stimulus). The task was to 
decide whether the test stimulus was the same as the cue stimulus. 
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in the cue face. In the control condition a line appeared instead of the cue face. Instead of the 
test face another line was presented on the scrambled array described above. Subjects had to 
decide whether the two lines had the same orientation. Thus, the test stimuli in the control 
condition contained virtually the same perceptual information as the test faces and the control 
task was a discrimination task as was the task in the experimental conditions. Subjects 
responded by pressing a button with the right index finger for same stimuli and with the left 
index finger for different stimuli. The procedural order of a trial can be seen in Figure 14. 
 
 
6.2.2 Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
and fMRI Data Analysis 
 
Gradient echo, echoplanar imaging was performed using a GE Signa 3 Tesla scanner, 
obtaining volumes of 32 3.5 mm thick axial images which were recorded in an interleaved 
manner (TR = 2.4 seconds, TE = 32 ms, FA = 90, FOV = 26 cm, 96 x 96 matrix). Two runs 
consisting of 306 volume scans each were obtained employing an event related design. The 
scans were aligned along the AC/PC axis and were then processed and analysed using SPM2 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). To correct for their different 
acquisition times, the signal measured in each slice was shifted relative to the acquisition time 
of the first slice using a sinc interpolation in time. The images of each subject were realigned 
to the first image to correct for head movement. Then the images were normalized into 
stereotaxic anatomical Montreal Neurological Institute (mni) space by using the 
transformation matrix calculated from the first volume of each subject and the EPI template 
provided by SPM2. Afterwards, the normalized data with a resliced voxel size of 3x3x3 mm 
were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (full-width at half-maximum 6 mm) to accommodate 
intersubject variation in brain anatomy. All analyses were restricted to trials on which 
responses were correct. The expected hemodynamic response at stimulus onset for each 
event-type was modelled by two response functions, a canonical hemodynamic response 
function (HRF) (Friston et al., 1998) and its temporal derivative. The temporal derivative was 
included in the model to account for the residual variance resulting from small temporal 
differences in the onset of the hemodynamic response, which is not explained by the HRF 
alone. The functions were convolved with the stimulus onsets to create covariates in a general 
linear model. Parameter estimates for the HRF regressor were calculated from the least mean 
squares fit of the model to the time series. Parameter estimates for the temporal derivative 
were not considered in any contrast. Incorrect responses were calculated as a parameter 
estimate of no interest. For every subject the contrasts testblr>control and testscr>control 
were calculated. In a random effects group analysis these contrasts were subjected to a paired 
t-test between the variables scrambled (scr) and blurred (blr). Voxels with a significance level 
of p < 0.001 uncorrected belonging to clusters with at least 5 voxels are reported. 
 
 
6.2.3 Results 
Behavioural data: The mean accuracy rate was 70.54% in the blurred condition, 
80.58% in the scrambled condition, and 90.18% in the control condition. Pair-wise 
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comparisons revealed that in the scrambled condition participants performed slightly better 
than in the blurred condition, p = .021. The accuracy in the control condition was significantly 
higher than the blurred condition, p < .001, and also higher than the scrambled condition, p < 
.05. The mean RT for blurred trials was 1133 ms (STD = 122.88), for scrambled trials the 
mean RT was 1184 ms (STD = 134.44), in the control condition the mean RT was 916 ms 
(STD = 93.86). Pair-wise comparisons showed no difference between scrambled and blurred 
condition (p = .559), but the RTs of the control condition were marginally shorter in the 
control condition that in the experimental conditions (blurred: p = .058, scrambled: p = .073). 
 
 
Table 1. Peak activations in blurred to scrambled contrast. Cerebral areas with corresponding Brodman areas 
(BA), Z-values and mni-coordinates for these peaks are reported. 
 
Cerebral area   side BA z-value coordinates (mni) cluster size 
 
Superior frontal gyrus R 10 4.58  24, 57, 27  6 
     6 3.96  9, 15, 63  29 
    L 6 3.50  -6, 6, 66   
     6 3.82  -9, 21, 60  17 
Medial frontal gyrus  L 32 3.72  -21, 48, 15  7 
     32 3.57  -6, 18, 48  9 
Inferior frontal gyrus  R 47 3.44  48, 33, -3  12 
Middle temporal gyrus L 39 3.53  -51, -57, 3  6 
    R 21 3.39  60, -54, 0  9 
 
 
fMRI Data: The paired t-test of testblr and testscr faces elicited a significant BOLD 
fMRI signal difference. Blurred trials as opposed to scrambled trials revealed activation in the 
middle temporal gyrus bilaterally. 
Additionally, the right and left superior frontal gyrus and the left medial frontal gyrus were 
activated by configural trials (see Table 1). Scrambled trials activated the left posterior 
fusiform gyrus, left precuneus, areas of the left parietal lobe, the left lingual gyrus and the 
right insula (see Table 2). Figure 15 illustrates the differential activation between blurred and 
scrambled processing. 
 
 
6.3 Discussion 
In the present study brain regions were traced that were selectively active for configural 
(blurred trials) and featural (scrambled trials) face processing. I found bilateral activation of 
the middle temporal gyrus during configural face processing. Featural processing selectively 
activated the left fusiform gyrus, parietal lobe, lingual gyrus, and precuneus. Furthermore, the 
right insula was activated during featural face processing. Because the visual information 
contained in the critical stimuli was the same for configural and featural processing, this 
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difference of activation can only be due to a different mechanism used for processing featural 
and configural information. The differential neural activation of featural and configural 
processing found in the present study is compatible with the dual-code view of face 
processing often suggested in previous studies (chapter 2; see also Bartlett et al., 2003; 
Cabeza & Kato, 2000; Schwaninger et al., 2002). 
 
 
Table 2. Peak activations in scrambled to blurred contrast. Cerebral areas with corresponding Brodman areas 
(BA), Z-values and mni-coordinates for these peaks are reported. 
 
Cerebral area   side BA z-value coordinates (mni) cluster size 
 
Precuneus   L 7 3.91  -15, -63, 36  8 
Insula    R 13 3.79  36, -42, 21  5 
Fusiform gyrus  L 37 3.75  -33, -54, -12  10  
Parietal lobe   L 31 3.74  -21, -51, 36  10 
Lingual gyrus   L 19 3.64  -27, -69, -3  6  
 
 
 
Left hemisphere activation when applying a featural processing mode is in line with 
findings of Martinez and colleagues (Martinez et al., 1997), who found hemispheric 
differences for local and global processing (see also Rossion et al., 2000).  
Andrews and Ewbank (2004) found evidence that face selective regions within the 
inferior temporal lobe are involved in the 
n of faces, while 
processing of changeable aspects of faces 
(e.g., different viewpoints of faces and facial 
expression) is associated with superior 
temporal face-selective regions. The present 
data suggest that configural and feature based 
processes embrace different regions than the 
inferior temporal lobe and in particular the 
FFA. The regions found for configural and 
featural processing are situated posterior to 
the fusiform face area. These findings are in 
line with the idea that featural and configural 
information is extracted from the input 
representation of a face in the primary visual 
cortex in the bottom-up course of the visual 
stream. These separate pathways then project 
to the FFA, were featural and configural 
information is combined to “holistic” face 
representations (c.f. Schwaninger et al., 
perception and recognitioL R
y = -53
 
Figure 15: Differential processing of featural 
(green) and configural (red) face information. The 
activation map (p<.001, uncorrected, minimal 
cluster size 5 voxels) is shown superimposed onto a 
selected coronal slice of the EPI-template provided 
by SPM2. The section was taken coronally; the 
anterior-posterior level is based on mni coordinates. 
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2002). 
Insofar the fact that the FFA showed no activation here may seem surprising only at 
first view. Given that the critical stimuli were intact faces in both conditions, it is plausible 
that regions selective for faces per se were subtracted in the contrasts at hand. Only activation 
that was selective for featural or configural processing remained. Activation of the FFA was 
typically found when faces were contrasted to objects or deranged faces. Here, intact faces 
were contrasted to intact faces, the only difference being the information given prior to the 
test face. The task could only be solved by using either configural or featural information to 
process the same intact face. Thus, the activation revealed by the present contrasts constitutes 
the processing mode adopted to encode the test face, suggesting that FFA is not specifically 
involved in configural and featural processing. This assumption is not consistent with the 
findings of Rossion and colleagues (Rossion et al., 2000), who reported a double dissociation 
between configural and featural processing modes within the FFA. This discrepancy may be 
the consequence of different paradigms. While in the study of Rossion et al. (2000) 
participants had to attend to either eyes, mouth, or the whole face and indicate whether the 
parts or the whole faces were the same. Possibly, the findings of Rossion et al. (2000) reflect 
different attentional strategies instead of configural and featural processing. The participants 
here had to match and therefore recognize a face on the basis of configural or featural 
information they just saw before. A further difference between these two studies is that 
Rossion et al. (2000) used a block-design in a PET-study, whereas here I used fMRI using an 
event-related design. Finally, Rossion et al. (2000) analysed the percentage of blood flow 
changes only within the right and left FFA. I was interested in the whole brain activity of 
featural and configural processing and did not restrict my analyses to face specific regions. 
The behavioural data suggest that configural and featural tasks were not of equivalent 
difficulty, as scrambled trials were solved more accurately than blurred trials. This imbalance 
in task difficulty reflects findings of a previous behavioural study using a similar design, 
where scrambled faces were matched more easily than blurred faces (Experiment 2).  Most 
other studies reported preponderance for configural face information (e.g., Cabeza & Kato, 
2000; Schwaninger et al., 2002). These studies however used learnt faces as stimuli, 
suggesting that configural information seems to be crucial for recognition of familiar faces. In 
contrast, featural information seems to be particularly important for recognizing novel faces 
(chapter 2). Because the faces in the present study were not learnt beforehand, my results 
reflect novel face perception. It could be argued that the differences in our BOLD responses 
could be related to differences in task difficulty. If so, more activated voxels in the visual 
areas would be expected, as more brain structures would be expected to be involved. 
However, the opposite was the case. Only 15 voxels were activated in the blurred trials 
compared to more than 26 in the scrambled trials. This indicates that the BOLD responses 
measured with fMRI can not be directly associated with behavioural measures, such as 
reaction times and accuracy (cf. McGonigle et al. 2000). However, the frontal regions that 
were activated during blurred trials reflect this unbalanced task difficulty.  
The data presented here therefore clearly suggest a dual-code view where featural and 
configural information is processed following separate pathways. Whether these pathways 
coincide with the ventral stream (“what-system”) and dorsal stream (“where system”) (Haxby 
et al., 1991; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) or with hemispheric differences is not clearly 
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apparent from the present data. The data suggest that featural processing is indeed lateralized 
whereas configural processing occurs bilaterally. Similarly, some of the regions processing 
featural information are indeed located ventral to the middle temporal gyrus, which showed 
more activation for configural processes. But at the same time featural processing activated a 
region parietal lobe, which lies dorsal to the middle temporal gyrus. Whether the dissociation 
found here is face specific or specific to featural and configural processes in general will have 
to be the issue of future studies. Against the background of distributed neural systems for 
domain specific processing it is conceivable that this dissociation of configural and featural 
processes will be found in all kind of visual recognition.  
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7. Synopsis: Where does all this leave us? 
Abstract 
In the following chapter the most important findings of chapters 2 – 6 are summarised 
and integrated into a new model of face processing. Furthermore, theoretical issues from 
chapter 1 are picked up and discussed anew. On the basis of the present findings the 
holistic hypothesis of face processing is defeated and instead, the featural-configural 
hypothesis relishes updraught. Finally, a few limitations of the present studies are 
discussed and issues for further research are suggested. 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The experiments reported in Chapters 2-6 help to understand the mechanisms involved 
in face recognition. The role of isolated featural and configural information was investigated 
by using scrambled and blurred faces as stimuli. Featural (or component, piecemeal) 
information is understood as the information contained in the facial parts, such as the eyes, 
nose and mouth. Configural information denotes the information contained in the spatial 
inter-relationship of the parts (see chapter 1 for further information on featural and configural 
processing). By scrambling a face into its constituent parts the detail information contained in 
the parts is preserved, while the spatial inter-relationship between them is disrupted. By 
blurring the faces with a low-pass filter the particular detail information is disrupted while the 
spatial inter-relationship between the parts is conserved. With this method featural and 
configural processing strategies could be activated separately and conclusions could be made 
about the nature of configural and featural representations. Overall, the studies challenge the 
view that faces are perceived, processed and stored as wholes. 
 
 
7.2 The defeat of the holistic hypothesis 
A consistent outcome of all the experiments presented here is that a pure holistic view 
where faces are processed and stored as unparsed wholes must be rejected. Specifically the 
experiments presented in chapters 2, 3, and 6 show that faces are not processed holistically, 
not exclusively anyway. Holistic face representations may well be found in the fusiform face 
area, but along the visual pathway featural and configural information seems to be processed 
following separate routes. In the experiments reported in chapter 2 scrambled and blurred 
faces could be reliably matched to intact whole faces. This finding gives evidence that both 
isolated featural and isolated configural information could be processed. A pure holistic view 
of face processing would not allow that faces can be recognized on the basis of the parts. 
However, in all experiments presented here featural information sufficed to recognize a face. 
In fact, in the experiments using novel faces featural information even seems to play a more 
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important role than configural information. The often reported predominance of configural 
information seems to hold only for faces which have been encoded longer than a second. In 
the first instance of seeing a novel face featural processing strategies seem to preponderate. 
As soon as a face is sufficiently studied, even during a very short time of a couple of seconds, 
configural representations can be built of the face and the importance of configural 
information increases. This could be demonstrated in Experiment 3, where half of the faces 
were intensively studied before the Experiment resulting in relatively better recognition of 
blurred faces. The featural-configural hypothesis of face perception found further support in 
the fact that no inversion effect was found for scrambled faces. Blurred faces however evoked 
a strong inversion effect. This differential sensitivity to inversion substantiates the 
presumption that configural and featural processing constitute two separate routes to face 
processing and is in line with findings of previous studies (e.g., Leder and Bruce, 2000; 
Sergent, 1984), which showed that configural changes were affected by inversion more that 
featural changes. The comprehension that faces are processed along two separate pathways is 
of computational interest when it comes to developing and enhancing electronic face 
recognition devices. All algorithms attempting to obtain similar performance in face 
recognition as normal human beings will coercively have to include separate processes for 
featural and configural information. 
The distinction of featural and configural processing modes has lead to the hypothesis 
claiming that faces are special in the way that they are processed predominantly on the basis 
of configural information as opposed to other objects which are reported to be processed part-
based. In accordance with this hypothesis, the results of Experiment 6 revealed that houses 
were less sensitive to inversion than faces. Regardless of the fact that houses are objects and 
thus are processed more part-based, this finding is noteworthy because houses, just like faces, 
are made up of a number of different parts (windows, doors, etc.) which are organized 
spatially to form an individual configuration. Moreover, Thatcherized houses, where the 
windows and doors were inverted within the whole house to create stimuli similar to 
thatcherized faces, failed to show a Thatcher effect comparable to faces. As the Thatcher 
effect is the result of the interrelation of featural and configural information on the one hand 
and inversion on the other, this finding suggests that configural information is not so 
important for house processing. While this finding is of special interest for research on object 
recognition, it suggests that faces are unique in the way that a) configural information is 
indeed more important for face than for object recognition and b) that the Thatcher illusion 
seems to be restricted to faces. 
 
7.3 Towards a new model of face perception 
Bruce and Young (1986) presented an influential model of face perception. In their 
model visual input undergoes structural encoding processes providing more abstract visual 
descriptions. These descriptions then project to the so-called face recognition unit (FRU). The 
FRU sends signals of resemblance to decision processes within the cognitive system. The 
cognitive system and the FRU then feed to the person identification nodes (PIN). 
The findings reported in the present thesis enhance the model proposed by Bruce and 
Young (1986) and also specify the model recently proposed by Schwaninger et al. (2002). A 
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Figure 16: New integrative model for face recognition: Visual input is first represented in the visual buffer 
(presumably located in primary visual cortex), from which featural and configural information is extracted 
and processed following separate pathways. In the face recognition unit these featural and configural 
representations are combined into a (“holistic”) representation of the whole face. During structural encoding 
the vestibular system feeds into the configural and featural representations providing information about the 
spatial orientation of the face with respect to gravity. Top-down activation of a face via visual mental 
imagery activates both configural and featural representations, albeit featural representations more than 
configural representations. 
new model of face recognition where the present findings are integrated is shown in Figure 
16. Specifically, the structural encoding processes can be characterized more precisely: The 
abstract visual description proposed by Bruce and Young (1986) can be differentiated in 
featural and configural processing. These processing types follow two separate pathways, as 
was substantiated in behavioural (Experiments 1-3) and neuro-imaging (Experiment 7) 
studies. Faces could be reliably recognised on the basis of isolated configural and featural 
information. In the model proposed here it is assumed that featural and configural information 
is extracted from the input representation in the visual buffer (presumably located in primary 
visual cortex), to form featural and configural representations. Brain structures involved in 
configural processing include the middle temporal gyrus. Featural processing takes place in 
the left posterior fusiform gyrus, left precuneus, areas of the left parietal lobe, and the left 
lingual gyrus. The featural and configural representations then feed forward to the face 
recognition unit (FRU), where they are combined into representations of the whole face. The 
FRU is presumably located in the FFA and the representations in the FRU may have holistic 
characteristics. This would explain why most neuro-imaging studies on face processing found 
activation in the FFA whereas Experiment 7 did not. In Experiment 7 whole faces where 
contrasted with whole faces, the only difference was that in one case a featural processing 
mode was activated and a configural processing mode was activated in the other. The 
activation found here revealed regions that are responsible for configural processing or 
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featural processing, respectively. Therefore it is not unexpected that I did not find activation 
in areas dedicated to whole face processing.  
Experiments 1-3 further revealed that in novel face recognition featural information 
preponderates, but during the process of familiarization configural information becomes 
relatively more important. Further, as the results of Experiment 4 showed, featural and 
configural representations can be activated bottom-up via visual perception and top-down via 
visual mental imagery. Top-down activated featural and configural representations then 
activate the face recognition units. However, visual mental imagery of learnt faces seems to 
activate primarily featural representations, whereas perception of the same faces activates 
featural and configural representations to similar extent. Whether activation of configural and 
featural representations feed back to primary visual cortex as hypothesized in the model 
proposed here and as would be assumed by Kosslyn will have to be explored in future studies.  
In connection with the face inversion effect Experiment 5 yielded interesting findings. It 
seems that configural and featural representations are not entirely independent of gravitational 
direction. Specifically, thatcherized faces were more difficult to detect when the observer was 
tilted 135° along the body roll axis. This suggests that not only the retinal orientation of the 
stimulus itself affects the FIE, but also the general orientation within the gravitational frame 
of reference. As for the proposed model this suggests that apart from input from primary 
visual cortex and top-down activation via mental imagery, configural and featural 
representations are also fed with information from regions computing gravitational spatial 
orientation. Since the Thatcher illusion specifically involves the interrelation of featural and 
configural information and Experiment 5 showed an interaction of body tilt and stimulus 
orientation, it seems plausible to assume a connection between the vestibular system and 
featural and configural representations. Whether the vestibular system also feeds into the 
primary visual representation or into the face recognition unit goes beyond the limits of the 
present findings. 
 
 
7.4 Limitations 
Face processing usually involves face identification. When we see a face we usually 
immediately know that it is Tom, or the postman, or the lady-who-lives-at-number-four. 
Similarly, when we look through glossy magazines we recognize photographs as Angelina 
Jolie or David Beckham. The act of face recognition therefore requires that we somehow get 
from a visual pattern (a face) to a semantic level of representation where the identity of the 
face is specified (cf. Bruce, 1988). In real life situations familiar faces are coded together with 
facts about the people such as their occupation, their hobbies, their marital status, age, 
address, etc. In contrast, face identification in experimental conditions mostly involves 
correctly recalling faces that have been studied beforehand. To which extent semantic 
information is used to identify faces has not been addressed in the studies presented in this 
thesis. When familiar faces were an issue (Experiments 3 and 4), a set of faces were studied 
beforehand, sometimes together with a name (Experiment 4). Personal information about the 
studied faces was not provided. Although this might restrict conclusions about familiar face 
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identification to a certain extent, the studies presented here manage to shed light on the 
perceptual aspects of face identification. 
Like most studies on face perception, the experiments reported here were conducted 
with front-view, two-dimensional, still pictures of neutral faces. However, faces are a 
complex three-dimensional class of objects and have a varying appearance depending on the 
view of the face. This is a problem which has been often neglected. Even Penry, the inventor 
of Photofit, described how faces appear balanced or unbalanced in terms of their proportion, 
but these proportions are derived entirely through consideration of faces as two-dimensional 
patterns (cf. Bruce, 1988). As to the use of front-view faces nothing can be said about view-
specific processing of faces on the basis of the present studies. All claims made here hold true 
for front view faces, whether the present findings can be generalized to other views will have 
to be the issue of future studies. 
The different parts of a face most likely do not share the same salience. For example, 
information contained in the eyes may be more concise than information contained in the 
nose. This may result in observers paying more attention to the eyes than to the nose in the 
scrambled conditions. Also, the conciseness of the parts may vary between individual faces. 
This was not controlled for in the present experiments. However, as all features were 
presented in the scrambled stimuli, differential importance of the individual features was not 
an issue. The participants could choose the most significant feature to solve the task. 
The present thesis concentrates on featural and configural processes of face perception. 
The same distinction is conceivable for object recognition. However, object recognition has 
barely been considered here. Solely the results of Experiment 6 using thatcherized houses as 
stimuli indicate that the interrelationship of configural and featural information is not so 
cogent in houses. Yet, it would be interesting to further investigate configural and featural 
processing in objects, especially against the background of the specifity of face processing. 
Planned studies will investigate scrambled and blurred common objects and will complement 
the findings of the present studies. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The studies presented in this thesis revealed that in face processing both configural and 
featural information play an important role and the processing of both information types 
follows two distinct pathways. Specifically, Experiments 1-3 and 7 give evidence that faces 
can be recognized when only one pathway is activated. That is, faces could be recognized 
when only configural or only featural information was provided. On the basis of these 
findings the model of face perception presented by Bruce and Young (1986) was specified 
and extended. From the input representation in primary visual cortex featural and configural 
information is extracted generating featural and configural representations. These 
representations can be activated bottom-up (Experiments 1-4 and 7) and top-down 
(Experiment 4). Furthermore, information from the vestibular system is fed into these 
representations (Experiment 5). Experiment 6 suggests that at least some aspects of face 
processing are face-specific, such as the Thatcher illusion. These findings are of 
computational interest when it comes to developing and enhancing electronic face recognition 
devices. 
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8. Glossary 
Blurred faces: Manipulation employed to separately investigate ? configural information. A 
low-pass filter is applied, resulting in the stimuli appearing blurred. 
d' (D-prime): Measure of signal detectability, equal to the difference between the z-
transformed hit rates and false alarm rates. A d’ significantly larger than 0 means that a 
signal could be detected above chance level. 
Configural information: Information contained in the spatial inter-relationship of the 
features.  
Dual mode view: View that both featural information and configural information play an 
important role in face processing and that featural and configural processing follow two 
distinct pathways. 
Face inversion effect (FIE): Phenomenon that faces appear to be much more sensitive to 
inversion than other object classes. 
Face recognition unit (FRU): assumptive theoretical location in the brain where face 
recognition occurs (cf. Bruce & Young, 1986; Bruce, 1988) 
Featural information: Information contained in the constituent parts of a face. Featural 
information is used interchangeably with piecemeal information or component 
information. 
First-order relational information: (= Categorical spatial relations). Basic arrangement of the 
facial parts (e.g., the nose lies between the eyes, above the mouth; cf. Diamond & 
Carey, 1986). 
Frame of reference: Set of standards with respect to which the properties of visual objects 
can be described. 
Fusiform face area (FFA): Area in the fusiform gyrus which shows activation when faces 
are presented in brain-imaging experiments such as fMRI. Because the FFA is 
particularly responsive to faces it has been assumed that the FFA is a face specific 
region. 
Gestalt: Visual apprehension where the perception of the whole takes precedence over the 
sum of its constituent parts, in the sense of “the whole is different than the sum of its 
parts”. 
Greebles: Computer-generated novel class of objects which are comparable to faces, as all 
exemplars share the same number of parts in the same first-order configuration. 
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Holistic face processing: View that faces are processed and stored as unparsed wholes, 
without explicitly representing the facial parts, comparable to a bitmap. 
IdentiKit faces: Dunleavy (1959; 1975). Facial composite construction system used by police 
forces to find criminals. The use of this system involves the selection of individual 
photographic parts from a kit, and then these component features are assembled into a 
whole face configuration. American version of the British ? Photofit system. 
Mental rotation: Process by which people are able to continuously change the orientation of 
an object in imagination. 
Oblique effect: Observation that performance of a visual task is superior when the stimuli are 
oriented vertically or horizontally compared to when they are obliquely oriented. 
Other race effect: Observation that faces of a foreign racial group seem to resemble each 
other more than faces of our own racial group. 
Person identification node (PIN):  Assumptive theoretical location in the brain where person 
recognition (as opposed to face recognition) occurs (cf. Bruce & Young, 1986; Bruce, 
1988) 
Photofit faces: Penry (1971). Facial composite construction system used by police forces to 
find criminals. The use of this system involves the selection of individual photographic 
parts from a kit, and then these component features are assembled into a whole face 
configuration. British version of the US American ? IdentiKit system 
Prosopagnosia: “Face-blindness”. People suffering from prosopagnosia are incabable of 
recognizing people by their faces. Often prosopagnosia arises after lesions in the FFA, 
but there is growing evidence of a congenital form of prosopagnosia. 
Schema: Organizing mechanism for information input and output which develops and 
improves according to experiences gained through interaction with incoming stimuli. 
Scrambled faces: Manipulation employed to separately investigate ? featural information. 
The facial parts are cut out and presented in a random arrangement, resulting in a loss of 
configural information while maintaining featural information. 
Second-order relational information: (= Metric spatial relations). Metric distances between 
the facial parts (cf. Diamond & Carey, 1986). 
Thatcher illusion: Illusion first described by Thompson (1980) where a face appears highly 
grotesque when eyes and mouth are inverted within the whole upright face. When 
viewed upside-down, such a face looks rather normal. 
Visual buffer: Spatially organized array within the visual system that constitutes the medium 
for visual images (cf. Kosslyn, 1994). It is suggested to be located within primary visual 
cortex. 
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